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THE EMBER-DAYS OF SEPTEMBER.

THE Church has set apart three days in each of the four seasons of the year which are especially devoted to public prayer, fasting, and almsgiving. They are intended as emphatic and united expressions of gratitude for the past favors of heaven; also as acts of reparation for the faults committed and to invoke the blessing of God upon His children for the coming season. Originally an inheritance from the Mosaic Law according to which such days were annually observed among the Jews, the Spouse of Christ has given them a special application by ordaining that the solemn consecration of priests take place at these times.[1]

If we examine more closely the liturgical character of these four cardinal points of the year, there appears something more than the general purpose of gratitude, penance and petition, whether applied to the temporal blessings only or to those which come to us through the sacramental virtue of the priesthood of the New Law. St. Leo the Great speaking of these Ember-fasts more than fourteen hundred years ago says: "From the fast of the Spring season in

[1] Tempora ordinationum sunt: Sabbata in omnibus Quatuor Temporibus, Sabbatum ante Dominicam de Passione et Sabbatum Sanctum.—Pontif. Roman. Rubricæ "de ordinibus conferendis."

Lent, and from that of Summer at Pentecost, and from the fast of the seventh month and that of December we learn that there is nothing without a purpose in the divine precept and that all the elements serve by the command of God for our instruction; thus even the four hinges of the world (mundi cardines) teach us continually like the four Gospels what we are to preach and what we are to do."[1] The weeks following Ash-Wednesday, Pentecost, the Feast of the Exaltation of the Cross, (14 Sept.,) and that of St. Lucia (13 Dec.,) which are the Ember-seasons receive apparently their light from the days with which a long tradition has linked them.

Vult Crux, Lucia, Cineres, Charismata data,
Ut det vota pia, quarta sequens feria.

The Ember seasons begin by marking man's creation from the dust of the earth, of which Ash-Wednesday (Cineres) reminds us in Spring, the birth-time of nature. Then follows the fast of Summer, recording the vivifying action of the Holy Ghost, perfecting the creation of man, training him by precept and prophecy under the old and new dispensations, under the law of Moses and that of the Gospel and through the multiform influences of personal divine inspiration. These are the "charismata data," the gifts of the Pentecostal Spirit which began with the inbreathing of the human soul in Paradise. Next comes the "Exaltation of the Cross," the saving power of the Church conquering the world in the sign of the Crucified, which sheds its rays upon the darkness of the world. And finally we have St. Lucia, whose sweet name has ever, since it found its place in the sacred Canon of the Mass, been identified with the enlightening virtue of that divine grace which, having attracted the human soul through the influence of faith, moves the will and produces the beautiful effects of heroic sanctity.[2] Thus the four-

[1] Op. Leon M. Serm. XIX, De Jejunio Decimi mensis. Migne edit. I, n. 59.

[2] Dante has given expression to this sentiment in his charming lines of the *Divina Comedia* (Infern. II, 97,) where he introduces himself as the devoted client of St. Lucia, who is said to have restored to him his eyesight. "She symbolizes"

fold action of the divine Master upon His creatures is brought home to the Christian, as the source of gratitude; and true gratitude of necessity includes sorrow for sin and confidence in the mercy of Him who has proved not only His claim upon man but His beneficence toward him as well. This reflection brings us nearer to the graces flowing from the Church and from the sacred ministry as the essential channel of the divine mercies. Hence our people are invited to offer their prayers during the Quarter-tenses not only in grateful recognition for the temporal blessings which heaven has bestowed on them and thus to propitiate the divine mercy for the season to come, but they are asked to pray for the laborers who are about to enter the vineyard of Christ and on whose activity depends to a large extent the realization of a rich harvest of souls.

So much applies to all the Ember-days and therefore also to those of the seventh month. But the latter allow of a separate study which marks more strongly their individual features. We have already seen how the September-fasts are linked to the feast of the Exaltation of the Cross. This fact brings home the relation which this penitential exercise bears towards the spread of the faith, the increase of the influence of our holy Mother the Church.

The Quarter-tense of September corresponds to the "fast of the seventh month" in the Jewish Church. The Mosaic law had originally enjoined but one day of fasting, which was the great Day of Atonement.[1] But the misfortunes which befell the Hebrew people in course of time had induced them to commemorate by solemn prayer and fasts the days on which great national calamities had occurred. Thus the Babylonish captives kept four annual fasts, in remembrance of the seizure of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans,[2] of

says Hettinger in referring to this passage "the higher, supernatural light, the grace of enlightenment, which must precede every good act of the will." (Die Goettl. Kom. d. Dante Alighieri. Chap. II, 4.)

[1] Lev. XXIII, 26–32.

[2] Jerem. LII, 6.

the destruction of the Temple,[1] of the murder of Godolias[2] and of the siege of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar.[3]

The murder of Godolias, who was the friend of the Prophet Jeremias, had apparently destroyed the last hope that the Jewish race might ever regain their national independence. Trusted by Nebuchadnezzar, Godolias had become a mediator between his captive people and the heathen nation that held them in subjection, and those who were animated by a true zeal for the ancient glory of Jehovah's chosen race looked upon him not only as the friend and honored kinsman who strove to alleviate their miseries, but cherished a secret hope that he might be one day the saviour of their race. His very name, "He whom Jehovah has made great," seemed a guarantee of divine blessings.

Unsuspecting, and in spite of having been warned of the danger which threatened his life, he fell by the hand of Ismahel a jealous rival, during a banquet. The word Ismahel was representative of evil omen. Whilst it signified the "hearing of God" it recalled also the prophecy about Hagar's son whose hand was to be "against every man and every man's hand against him."[4] Thus Ismahel became a type of the persecutors of God's people and in particular of those who themselves had received the message of God, but who not following its precepts became a scandal and hindrance to the faithful.[5] The Christian commentators, especially the Fathers of the Church explain the character of Ismahel, the son of Abraham as a prophetic image of those who, although having been baptized and received the light of the Gospel, nevertheless have no part in Christ's inheritance and being slaves to sin are hostile to the true children of the household of God and wage continual war against the Church.

[1] II. Kings XXV, 8.

[2] Jerem. XLI, 43.

[3] II. Kings. XXV, 1. Jerom. LII, 4.

[4] Gen. XVI, 12; XXV, 18.

[5] Uti olim Ismael ironice lusit cum Isaac, eum vexando et persequendo, ita nuns Judæi Christum regem libertatis irriserunt, vexarunt, crucifixerunt, ejusque libertoc Christianos pertinaci odio persequuntur. Cornel.a Lap. in Epist. ad. Galat. IV, 29.

The figure of Ismahel in his conduct toward Isaac found its perfect verification in the Jewish Church when another Ismahel, also descended of David, secretly persecuted and murdered Godolias the representative of all that was noble and good among the remnant of Israel. And the same finds its repetition to-day in the hostility of the sectaries who claiming kinship with, and the name of Christ persecute his Vicar and representative on earth.

This then gives us the key to the meaning of the prayer and fast of the Ember-week in September, so far as it corresponds to the Jewish fast of the seventh month. To the true Hebrew that fast was an act of penance and a propitiatory offering for the wrong done by one, who claimed the hallowed name of Jew, against the elect of God, Godolias, the peacemaker, the father and friend of the nation, the devout worshipper of Jehovah in whom they trusted to bring a speedy end to the time of suffering and bondage. And to the Catholic it is an act of penance, of propitiation, of prayer for the exaltation of holy Church, and her triumph over the enemies of Christ and His anointed Vicar on earth.

And this characteristic feature of prayer for the Church, for her ministers, above all for the Sovereign Pontiff may be readily and distinctly noticed in the entire liturgy of the Ember-week in September. The prayers of the mass are not a cry merely of hope mingled with expectant joy, as in the Ember-days of Advent, nor a wail of trustful sorrow for sin as if we were joining our humble penance with the Sacrifice commemorated in Holy Week, nor the grateful self-denial in acknowledgement for the gifts of the Holy Ghost which marks the Ember-week after Pentecost; but there is in the prayers at this time an exultant tone which would be incompatible with sorrow or penance of any kind did we not know its secret. When the Catholic prays for the exaltation of holy Church he is altogether confident of the success of his prayer. He never imagines the Church, but as founded on the rock against which the gates of hell shall never prevail;

and this gives to his prayer a sense of fortitude and strengtn such as one might suppose in a soldier who whilst conquered for the moment is in possession of a secret which assures him that he will gain the ultimate victory. Such is also the tone of the Hebrew prophets. Jehovah will arise and dissipate the enemies of His people though he presently chastiseth the children for their transgressions.

It is therefore with a sound of joy that the Mass opens on Wednesday of this week. And as if the Spouse of Christ had foreseen how St. Joseph would one day be recognized as the great protector and special patron of the Church, she introduces from the very beginning his prototype the Patriarch of Egypt, the Saviour of Israel's inheritance. "Exsultate Deo adjutori nostro, jubilate Deo Jacob:—Testimonium in Joseph posuit illud.[1] It is to this prophetic foresight that we must refer the gladness which is even in the Old Testament allied to these days of fast and penance. "The fast of the fourth month, and the fast of the fifth and the fast of the seventh and the fast of the tenth, shall be to the house of Juda joy and gladness and great solemnities: only love ye truth and peace." (Zach. viii, 19).

The lessons of the Mass and Breviary point to the same end. Prayer and fasting are but to strip our spirits of that weakness which comes from the load of the flesh dragging us to the earth. We put on the strength of Jehovah by dispelling the demon of quiet self-indulgence. "Hoc genus in nullo potest exire, nisi in oratione et jejunio."[2] Diffidence in ourselves, shame in the recognition that our sins alone hinder the triumph of God's cause on earth, penance to prove the disposition of our will—all these elements of the Church's prayer during this time are in perfect harmony with the consciousness of God's protecting strength who will give the victory to His people. The first reading in the mass of Wednesday is from the prophet Amos. God

[1] *Introit*, Miss. Fer. IV. Quat. Temp. Septembr.

[2] Evang. Miss. hujus diei.

will convert the captivity of His people and the Church will grow and the extent of her blessings will be all over the earth, "Ecce dies veniunt, et comprehendet rator messoarem, et calcator uvæ mittentem semen et stillabunt montes dulcedinem, et omnes colles culti erunt. Et convertam captivitatem populi mei Israel." [1] "Who is like to the Lord our God—raising up the needy and the poor." [2] The second lesson, taken from the book of Esdras, answers to the sentiment aroused in the heart of the faithful by this question. Like one man all the people "all who could understand" gathered around their priests, on the first day of the seventh month. And Esdras the scribe stood upon a lofty platform, high above all the people, and he explained to them the law and he blessed them, and they raised their hands and then fell prostrate upon the ground. Then he bade them rejoice because "the joy of the Lord is our strength." And the Gradual which immediately follows corresponds to the foregoing thought. "Blessed nation, the people whom God has chosen as his special inheritance!—The heavens have been strengthened by His word, and from the spirit of His lips proceeds all power."

The Gospel is a confirmation in the New Law of the spirit inculcated by the prophets in the Old Testament. A deaf and dumb spirit harasses the son of a believer in Christ. Even the prayer of faith appears to be without avail, for the disciples cannot cast out the demon. But prayer and fasting conquers the adversary, whose strength seemed for a time to prevail even against those whom God Himself had sent to establish His reign. Thus victory is assured to the Church, but the demon of hostility is banished only by the union of the faithful in prayer and fasting, "hoc genus in nullo potest exire, nisi in oratione et jejunio." [3]

The liturgy of Friday during this Ember-week is in the same

[1] Lect. Miss. dici.

[2] Graduale ibid.

[3] Evangel. missæ

tenor as that of Wednesday. But if the Church calls her faithful children to united penitential prayer for the freedom and prosperity of holy Church, bidding them not to be faint-hearted, although she seems tied in bonds and deep humiliation, and her enemies exult on every side, yet she would warn them that the mere acts of prayer and fasting avail not without charity. This is the distinct thought of the Gospel on Friday. That Gospel is accompanied by the special prediction of our Lord that its principal incident will be repeated to the end of time. Magdalen in tears triumphs over the "righteous" Pharisees "because she has loved much." The sorrowing Magdalen is an image of the Church in tears, of the penitent congregation gathered at the feet of the Master. "I shall heal their sorrows and love them of my own accord, because my anger is turned aside from them. I shall be as the dew; Israel shall blossom as a lily.—Her branches shall go forth and her glory be like the olive tree and her odor like that of Libanus." These words of the Prophet Osee in the Epistle of the day are well adapted to express the feelings of confidence with which the penitent lover is inspired who follows the leading of the Church at this season. It will all end well if you keep in the way of the Lord. "For the ways of the Lord are sure; the just walk in them; but the prevaricators will be destroyed in them."[1] Love therefore is an essential requisite to make our fast acceptable and fruitful.

The liturgy of Saturday is very beautiful. It repeats the previous sentiments by recalling from the book of Leviticus the law of expiation.[2] In the prayer which follows upon the first reading the Church asks that the divine blessing given to our abstinence may "make us stronger than all our enemies." Next we have our confidence increased by a reference to the past action of Jehovah towards His people who

[1] Lect. Osee. 1. c.

[2] Decimo die mensis hujus septimi, dies expiationum erit celeberrimus, et vocabitur sanctus: affligetisque animas vestras in eo, et offeretis holocaustum Domino. Lect. libr. Lev. cap. xxiii., miss. sabb.

are His chosen flock. "O Lord our God, feed Thy people as of old. The nations will see it and be confounded in all their might.—Thou hast sworn it, O Lord." [1] But we are also reminded that in order to obtain the promise of God we must be true to our covenant. Our fasts and prayers are not to be a superstitious service of slavish compliance with the law, but to be accompanied by a change of heart. Our homage is to be that of children, coming from a purified and joyous heart. Thus "the fast of the seventh month" is to be "to the house of Juda, joy and gladness: love ye truth and peace." [2] The fifth lesson in this mass is from Daniel. It describes how the Angel of the Lord descended with Azarias and his companions into the fiery furnace. No harm befell them, but the flames consumed their adversaries, the Chaldeans who had sought to bring them to grief. The meaning of this is plain. The angel of God is with the Church amid the flames of persecution. The persecutors will be destroyed by their own efforts directed against the faithful children of God. After each of the preceding lessons the minister answers in the name of the people "Deo gratias." Not so after this lesson. Instead of this the hymn "Benedictus es, Domine" is chanted or recited, to express the beautiful trust of the children in the power and love of Jehovah, "the Lord God of our Fathers." Thus we give expression to the conviction that the fast and penances of these three days, far from hurting us will only extinguish our faults (See the oration which follows), and furthermore destroy our enemies. The last reading is from the Epistle of St. Paul to the Hebrews. He describes the Church of Christ, the new Tabernacle, where the High Priest will abide for good (Christus assistens Pontifex futurorum bonorum) and lead His faithful to the Church triumphant (æterna redemptione inventa).

The Gospel of this day combines the same elements. The

[1] Lect. Michæac Proph. l. c.

[2] Lect. Zachar. l. c.

parable of the fig-tree, the cure of the infirm woman and the lesson which our Lord draws from the latter against the pharisees, indicate the successive steps of repentance, forgiveness and joyous triumph. The scene portrayed by St. Luke is that of the chief of pharisees who has heard the parable of the fig-tree and has witnessed the cure of the infirm woman, angrily reproaching our Lord for His indulgent mercy toward sinners. It is a repetition of Magdalen's case. "Eighteen years this daughter of Abraham has been in the bonds of Satan, and should she not be freed?" "And when He said these things all His adversaries were ashamed: and all the people rejoiced for all the things that were gloriously done by Him."[1] Thus will the Church triumph and silence her enemies. She, the bearer of mercies to the repentent, will go forth out of the darkness of persecution as did the children of Israel go forth from Egypt. "In the seventh month shall you celebrate this feast—that your posterity may know that I made the children of Israel to dwell in Tabernacles when I brought them out of the land of Egypt."[2]

There are other aspects of this Ember-fast, which allow likewise of a particular spiritual application to the Church of Christ; but we must limit ourselves for the present to the one view explained and which makes it a season of prayer for the Church and her visible head on earth.

THE EDITOR.

[1] St. Luke xiii, 17, Evang. Miss.

[2] *Communio* Missæ diei.

CRANIOTOMY FROM THE THEOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.

AN eminent Physician expresses in very clear terms the necessity, when we examine whether craniotomy is justifiable on the living child, of appealing finally to moral and religious principles for the right solution. He says: "It is not simply a question for medicine to decide; religion and the civil law claim a voice, *a preponderating voice*. . . ." We leave to others to set forth the claims of the civil law; but we take up the defence of the still higher religious right, anterior and superior to the opinions and experience of obstetricians. This subordination of the medical to the theological point of view suggested to one of them that the question: "Is craniotomy justifiable on the living child," pre-supposes this other eminently moral question: whether we have under any circumstances the right to destroy human life.

We accept this ground, so broad, so well-chosen. But before working on it, it may be good to lay stress on the admission by Craniotomists that, in order to justify their doctrine or practice, they must prove that in some cases it is morally right to take human life; and, since the principle, the rule and measure of human right is God's mind and will, expressed for us in His law, it must be ascertained whether the law of God permits us to deprive a man of life; —when it does so;—and whether one of the cases is the one in which some physicians resort to craniotomy.

God has made man for Himself, and all created goods for men. Under *His sovereign domain*, He lets us acquire and exercise a true right of property, because all *things* are *means* which man may use for fulfilling his destiny and obtaining the end of his creation. The vast stores of nature contain such an abundance and such a variety of goods for the service of mankind that our right in them allows us not

only to appropriate them, but to exchange, alienate, give them. All things are ours; but not so are persons. No person is a *means* for another person to use or dispose of; every personal being belongs to God alone. God has, it is true, granted to each of us, a right, so to speak, of *usufruct* in whatever constitutes our personal being: faculties of the mind, powers of our body, life itself; but not the ownership, which He has reserved to Himself. If no personal being may thus take his own life, nobody may, without usurping a divine attribution, take the life of any other person: "non occides," except by an express divine concession.—Now there is an express divine permission of putting a man to death only in two cases: 1. In the case of a just condemnation for a capital crime, because God who is the Author of human society, wants to protect it in the enjoyment of public security, even, when necessary, by depriving of their life such men as would disturb it by bloodshed and violence. 2. In the case of legitimate self-defence; because the innocent has the right of protecting himself against an unjust aggression. If the invader loses his life, he is the only guilty cause of his misfortune.[1]

How will Craniotomists prove that when they sacrifice the unborn babe, he is truly a criminal convicted of a capital offence for which he deserves death; or at least that the mother on whose behalf they shed that innocent blood, stands on her legitimate self-defence for her own life?—Let them draw up their own evidence. . . . Well, this is their plea in the most moderate terms: when craniotomy is not resorted to, both mother and child must die; whilst, if this operation on the living subject be performed, the mother's life may be saved; then fœticide is not murder, is not morally wrong, being done for the purpose and with the high probability of saving the mother.

[1] Lehmkuhl, 1 vol. n. 831. Bonal: De Decalog. n. 273—Marres: De Justit. L. 16 Append. n. 269.

Compare this presentment of the case with the moral standard which, according to the medical authorities we referred to at the beginning, *must have a voice, a preponderating voice* in the decision. This standard is not only not reached, but is not even aimed at. By this standard, the question is not what will become of the child and the mother; nor which of the two lives is the more precious: nay, the question must not stop there; it must rise higher, up to God Himself, the Creator, Master, and Author both of the mother and the child; to God who knows well the relative value of their lives and yet has given to this child the right to his own life, just as the mother has the right to hers. The life of the child does not belong to the mother, no more than the mother's life belongs to the child. The question then must finally come to this: Has the babe, under the law of God, forfeited the right to his own life? or does the mother stand against him in legitimate self-defence? . . .

Evidently the infant cannot be accused of any capital crime. It remains for the Craniotomists to liken him to an insane man who being on the way of killing another man, might be justly killed. But the parity does not hold good: the insane man *does act* against the right which his neighbor has to his own life; and if this right cannot be protected otherwise than by killing the unjust assailant, he may be justly killed. On the contrary, the unborn child is in the condition of a purely passive agent under the action of nature *he does not act* against his mother's life; no more; than *he acts* against his own life. *He is acted on;* as the mother herself is *acted on* by abnormal natural circumstances for which the child is certainly not morally responsible, although both mother and child may be the victims of them. It cannot be denied that the unborn fœtus possesses an active energy of its own, since it is a distinct personal being. But it does not and cannot exercise any free power; it moves under and is moved by the fatal laws of intra-uterine existence. Consequently the fact that, in the dis-

tressing circumstances described by Craniotomists, the child, if not forcibly removed, must die unborn after causing the death of the mother, does not imply against this innocent human being and in favor of the mother, any exception to the divine prohibition, "non occides." Therefore craniotomy on the living fœtus is never allowed; fœticide is even in this case, murder, and absolutely wrong.

The purpose of the physicians of saving the mother by substituting a violent to the natural death because the child must otherwise die a short time later, is indeed excellent, but *the means* used is bad; and no good end can justify a wicked means: "non sunt facienda mala ut eveniunt bona" says St. Paul.[1] In the actual performance, the sinful means must take place first: "medium prius in executione," as schoolmen say, and it vitiates the good purpose which practically ceases to be good when thus obtained by a crime. How, in fact, can a proceeding be morally good which begins by a murder? Can this be a genuine benefaction which of two innocent persons kills one in order to save the other?

When we conclude from the reasons so far given that craniotomy on the living child is a crime, we qualify the thing in itself, in the light of objective morality. We do not pretend to judge, still less to condemn and brand as so many criminal executioners of the innocent, respectable and intelligent members of the medical profession who seek in some qualified cases to justify craniotomy upon the living subject. Their conscience on the point, although certainly erroneous, may however be in good faith. But their error, though excusing them, is none the less pernicious to religion and true humanity. This is the reason that prompted us to write with a view to dispel it. We are convinced that any physician worthy of his noble profession, will welcome the truth, once fully realized, in spite of the restrictions it may set on his practice in some extreme cases, knowing that the only true measure and rule of genuine philanthropy is the

[1] Rom. iii. 8.

philanthropy of God Himself as contained in the decalogue. Strong in his enlightened conviction of the absolute illicitness of craniotomy, a christian physician will stand the embarrassment of desperate cases and will not allow himself to be dizzied by the emotional appeals of a false and sentimental humanity; nor will he fear the blame of some less well informed professional brethren who may qualify his refusal of practising craniotomy, when it could save the mother, as matricide. He knows full well, for his justification, that he incurs no responsibility for not assisting the mother by a means God forbids him to employ. Omission is then no blunder; still less a crime; but a respectful acquiescence in the divine law "non occides."

This absolute prohibition of craniotomy by the christian law succeeded so efficiently in checking the contrary practice of pagan ages that, according to Rodriguez de Castro [1] the Arabian physicians were the only ones who advocated it.—Till our own time, Catholic theologians had been unanimous in teaching that it is never allowed to kill the living child in the interest of the mother [2] Sanchez in his standard work on marriage [3] condemns it as an enormous crime: "nefas capitale," and a practice essentially bad: "intrinsice malum est." St. Alphonsus Liguori is no less decided in proscribing this disorder: "Si remedium directe tendat ad occisionem fœtus.... hæc quidem nunquam licent." [4] The late Archbishop P. R. Kenrick [5] declares emphatically that, without doubt, "pro re explorata haberi debet" it is never allowed to destroy the living fœtus for the sake of the mother, this being a murder and essentially bad; "nunquam licere pharmacum dare quod ad abortum dirigatur..., nec licere instrumentis fetum excidere ut per partes extrahatur: hæc est enim hominis occisio, quæ per se mala est; ide-

[1] De morbis mulierum. l. iv. c. ix.

[2] Acta S. Sedis—vol. viii. App. v.

[3] l. ix. Diss, xx. n. 14.

[4] l. iii. n. 334. Q. 2.

[5] Th. mor. vol. i. T. iii. n. 128.

oque nequidem ad vitam matris servandam potest licere."—The Fathers of the Tenth Provincial Council of Baltimore[1] solemnly warn Catholic mothers against craniotomy; "no mother is allowed, under any circumstances, to permit the death of her unborn infant, not even for the sake of preserving her own life, because the end never justifies the means; and we must not do evil that good may come from it."[2] This charge of the Catholic Bishops was a reasonable one; for whilst formerly the deliberate destruction of the living fœtus, preliminary to the extraction of its mutilated body was, under christian civilization, a rare exception, it had, for the last fifty years, gradually become a regular operation very frequently practised, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, supported by the authority of eminent obstetricians. The abuse was carried so far that Archbishop P. R. Kenrick could say with truth, that it had become the practice of the greater number of physicians: "Hunc esse usum et consuetudinem plerorumque medicorum."[3] This predominance of craniotomy being in direct opposition to the teaching of Catholic Theologians who had been so far unanimous in condemning it, created often, at the bedside of mothers in laborious confinements, a most perplexing antagonism between the Catholic priest and the physician. This distressing position prompted a few Catholic Divines, principally Canonists, not to question indeed the fact of the morally unanimous agreement of Theologians in proscribing craniotomy, but to raise exceptions to the grounds of their common doctrine and thereby to shake its binding authority.—Avanzini, the able editor of a Roman Review of Canon Law "Acta Sanctæ Sedis," was the first to open the discussion; but all the reasons which were adduced by him and a few adherents, may be, according to Lehmkuhl,[4] substantially summed up in the one we refuted above namely, that

[1] An. 1869.

[2] Collect. Lacens. iii. vol., Col. 1273, iii. murder of the Innocent.

[3] Th. mor. T. iii. n. 128.

[4] 1. vol. n. 8772.

the child is the unjust, although innocent, assailant of the mother.

This new controversy on so important and practical a subject, could not remain long at the stage of a free private disputation. Card. Caverot, late Archbishop of Lyons, referred it to the Holy See, which on 28th of May, 1884, by a Decree of the S. Congr. of the Inquisition, confirmed by Leo XIII., condemned as unsound the opinions that craniotomy on the living child is allowed when otherwise both the mother and the child must die. To realize fully the right of this decision, we should observe that it is directed against craniotomy viewed under its most favorable circumstances, viz: when it is the only means of saving the mother and when without it, both mother and child must perish. This amounts practically to its universal condemnation by the highest moral authority in the world. In fact this Act of the Holy See put an end to the short-lived controversy among contemporary Catholic Theologians and brought back the old unanimity of doctrine.

More recently, Aug. 19th. 1889, another decree of the same Congr., not only renews the condemnation of craniotomy, but extends it to any operation *which causes directly the death either of the child, or the mother.* This motive for the prohibition implies that craniotomy is direct, downright murder and that its supporters were wrong when they considered it as *a merely indirect cause* of the child's death. We give here the text of this second Decree: "In Scholis Catholicis tuto doceri non posse licitam esse operationem chirurgicam quam craniotomiam appellant, sicut declaratum fuit die 28 maii 1884 et quamcumque chirurgicam operationem directe occisivam fœtus vel matris gestantis."

What has meanwhile taken place in the camp of Craniotomist obstetricians? There also a reaction has occurred, brought on not by any authority, but by the very extreme excess of the evil. Says Dr. Busey: "In my first annual address; five years ago, I predicted that the discussions of

the relative propriety of the operation of craniotomy upon the living fœtus and the cesarean sections, then in progress, would result in a modification of the views held by a majority of obstetricians, and that the time would come when the cesarean section and other conservative procedures, which offered the chance of saving two lives, would supplant the killing of the fœtus that the chances of the mother's recovery might be improved. I did not then anticipate the rapid progress of the revolution which I felt assured had begun, nor that, at this early date, science would have so nearly accomplished that result." [1]—Now to complete that happy revolution and accomplish entirely that most desirable result, medical science should keep in view the great truth proclaimed by one of its eminent adepts, with which we premised our present remarks: "It is not simply a question for medicine to decide; Religion and the Civil law claim a voice, *a preponderating voice*." This preponderating voice of Religion has pronounced its decision; why should not its preponderating claim be the plank to bridge over the now narrow interval obstetrics has not yet been able to get over?

P. F. Dissez, S. S.

[1] The wrong of Craniotomy p. 1.—1889.

NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH INFLUENCE.

NATURAL RIGHTS.

THE panacea of socialism having been "utterly rejected" as contrary to the "natural right of man," injurious to the workingmen themselves, and calculated "to introduce confusion and disorder into the commonwealth," the Holy Father finds in revelation and natural law the true solution of the social problem. Here our attention is claimed by two principles which underlie the masterly development of the Pontiff's teaching.—The first is the existence and sacredness of natural rights. There are moral powers derived from God, but abiding in man, insomuch as man is the image of his Maker and *a person*, that is to say, an intelligent being master of his own acts. Such powers necessarily follow the duties assigned to man, and are given him that he may accomplish the will of God; they must be respected by all, and kept inviolate by the supreme civil authority.—Secondly, natural rights reside first in the individual or person; they expand, as it were, in the domestic society: then, rises the State, bound by duties, but provided with all the rights that are necessary for the fulfilment of those duties. Since the individual came first, the family next, and the State last, it is absurd to attribute to the State the creation of rights which must have existed before the formation of any commonwealth.

Not only is the existence of natural rights taught by all the Catholic theologians, but it is also maintained by the highest legal authorities. One quotation will suffice. We shall borrow it from the Commentaries of James Kent.[1] The words of the illustrious Chancellor are as follows:

"The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These rights have been justly considered, and frequently declared by the

[1] Part IV, *Lecture XXIV.*

people of this country, to be natural, inherent, and inalienable."

Such was the doctrine of the founders of the great American republic, but the sophisms of modern would-be philosophers have so weakened the best established convictions that they are gradually losing their hold on the public mind. Not to speak of Hobbes, who attributed to the *fiat* of civil power the creation both of moral right and of moral wrong; not to mention Bentham, who makes utility the *ultima ratio* of morality, and avers that the government fulfils its office "by *creating rights*" which it confers upon individuals; rights of personal security; rights of protection for honor; rights of property;" we find in the writings of such a conservative philosopher as the late lamented Stanley Jevons the following strange words: "The first step must be to rid our minds of the idea that there are such things as abstract rights." By *abstract* Professor Jevons means *natural*. In a similar vein, Matthew Arnold writes: "An author has no natural right to a property in his production. But then neither has he a natural right to anything whatever which he may produce or acquire." After quoting the two last-mentioned writers, Mr. Spencer,—himself a refined utilitarian, but a strong and skillful defender of natural rights,—adds the following significant words:

"So, too, I recently read in a weekly journal of high repute that, 'to explain once more that there is no such thing as natural right would be a waste of philosophy.' And the view expressed in these extracts is commonly uttered by statesmen and lawyers in a way implying that only the unthinking masses hold any other. One might have expected that utterances to this effect would have been rendered less dogmatic by the knowledge that a whole school of legists on the continent maintains a belief diametrically opposed to that maintained by the English school."[1]

Mr. Spencer is right; more consideration and less dogmatism might be expected from lawyers and statesmen;

[1] "The Great Political Superstitions" by Herbert Spencer.

but if we had not a higher authority than that of continental schools, the "unthinking masses" would soon take up the denial so confidently put forward by their modern leaders, and the whole edifice of ethics and sociology would rest on no better foundation than the shifting sands of expediency.

The gravity of the danger shows how opportune is the insistence with which the Pope proclaims certain rights as belonging to man by nature. He is most emphatic in declaring that private property in land, as well as in capital, "is pre-eminently in conformity with human nature," and he draws as a necessary consequence the limitation of State power with regard to property:

"The right to possess private property is from nature, not from man; and the State has only the right to regulate its use in the interest of the public good, but by no means to abolish it altogether."

Is this a condemnation of the nationalization of land?—Undoubtedly, if this nationalization is accomplished without the consent of the owners. Does it prohibit such a consent; or condemn a commonwealth in which private property had never been introduced?—Not directly; but the august teacher warns us that such a polity would be unnatural, in a complete or "political society."

"With reason the common opinion of mankind, little affected by the few dissentients who have maintained the opposite view, has found in the study of nature, and in the law of nature itself, the foundations of the division of property, and has consecrated by the practice of all ages the principle of private ownership, as being pre-eminently in conformity with human nature and as conducing in the most unmistakable manner to the peace and tranquility of human life."

Statesmen who should disregard the verdict of mankind and the practice of all ages would certainly go to the extreme limit of rashness; their deluded followers would soon find out that nature does not adapt itself to the whims of political dreamers, and the fabric raised on a socialistic

basis would be swept away by the advance of civilization. "Private ownership, as we have seen, is the natural right of man; and to exercise that right it is not only lawful, but absolutely necessary."

Is the doctrine of the Holy Father at variance with the theory of Eminent Domain? If by Eminent Domain we mean, with some legists, a pre-existing, essential, and illimitable right of property residing in the State, then Eminent Domain is incompatible with private ownership; but if we use the word in a Catholic sense, if we consider the right itself as an application of the supreme jurisdiction of the State, a consequence of the duty which binds the State to procure the public welfare, and, (as a necessary means) to require from the citizens what is indispensable for the welfare of the city, then it is inseparable from the supreme civil authority. It is not a real ownership, *Dominium proprietatis*, it is a necessary consequence of jurisdiction, *Dominium jurisdictionis*.

From the rights of the individual to the domestic rights, there is but one step.

"A family, no less than a State," says the Holy Father, "is a true society, governed by a power within itself, that is to say, by the father. Wherefore, provided the limits be not transgressed which are prescribed by the very purposes for which it exists, the family has at least equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of those things which are needful to its preservation and its just liberty. We say at least equal rights; for, since the domestic household is anterior, both in conception and in fact, to the gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately on nature."

These words are teeming with important lessons. When we trace rights and duties to their fountain-head, we may choose either the ideal or the historical order. We may grasp mentally a first concept, and follow it in its evolution;

or we may take hold of a fact, and run backward to find the cause. Whichever way we choose to take, the family stands forth anterior to the state. Ideally, the first concept is that of a rational being, *Animal Rationale;* that being receives its first complement within the family circle, it becomes *Animal Domesticum;* its full development is not to be obtained outside of the social state, hence it must be also *Animal Sociale*, or *Politicum*, as Aristotle hath it. Again, if we look for the fact which has preceded the formation of the commonwealth, our eyes light on the household; back of the household stands the father. We might add that both the commonwealth and the household shall cease to exist, at least in their corporate capacity, but that the individuals which composed both shall outlive this world. As a consequence, there are some rights of the individual which even parental authority must respect, and some rights of the family against which the state may not trespass. Again, among the rights and duties which are evolved from natural law, some are so closely bound up with the first principles that they may be considered as self-evident; others are easily deduced from the first principles; not a few are connected with the first principles by so subtle a logical thread that it requires considerable mental keenness to follow it through the complicated deductive process, from the first major to the last consequence. In the difficult problems which arise from the conflicts of rights and duties, proximity to a first self-evident principle of natural law must not be neglected: all other things equal, those rights and duties must predominate which "rest more immediately on nature."

Personal rights, which belong to man, precisely because he is bound to conform himself to his last end, and use the necessary means to obtain it, are prior to the rights of the family; and the rights of the household, considered as a society in itself, governed by a power within itself, and having for its end both the permanency and the perfection of the species, rest more immediately on nature than the rights of

the commonwealth. This does not imply that the *interests* of the individual must predominate over those of the family, or the interests of the household overrule those of the State. Man is not only an individual being, master of his own acts: he is also a member of the family, and an imperfect State-unit. We say "imperfect" because, in his individual capacity, he lacks the completeness and permanency required in a perfect unit. Now the good of the head considered as a part of a more complex organism, is subordinate to good of the whole. The family is not only a society in itself, it is also a perfect national unit. Insomuch as it is a national unit, its interest must yield to the good of the commonwealth. "The idea that the civil government should, at its own discretion, penetrate and pervade the family and the household is a great and pernicious mistake." But when personal rights of children or other members of the family are rudely and clearly violated within the household itself, then the "public power must interfere to force each party to give the other what is due; for this is not to rob the citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them." Again, "if a family finds itself in a great difficulty, utterly friendless and without prospect of help, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public aid; for each family is a part of the commonwealth." To help the helpless, to maintain the rights of all, such is the province of the State. "But the rulers of the State must go no further; nature bids them stop here." To make the child a property of the commonwealth, or to push aside parental authority, would be as fatal to modern society as it was to Sparta, and other pagan commonwealths.

"Several of the States of antiquity, says Kent, were too solicitous to form their youth for the various duties of civil life to intrust their education solely to their parents; but this was upon the principle, totally inadmissable to the modern civilized world, of the absorption of the individual in the body politic, and of his entire subjection to the despotism of the state."

[1] Comment., *lect. xxv.*

With a higher authority, the sovereign Pontiff tells us:

"Paternal authority can neither be abolished by the State nor absorbed, for it has the same source as human life itself. 'The child belongs to the father,' and is, as it were, the continuation of the father's personality; and, to speak with strictness, the child takes its place in civil society, not in its own right, but in its quality as a member of the family in which it is begotten.... The socialists, therefore, in setting aside the parent, and introducing the providence of the State, act against *natural justice*, and threaten the very existence of family life."

Socialists, properly so-called, are not the only ones to teach this dangerous error; many modern writers, regardless of the 'coming slavery' foretold by Mr. Spencer, would introduce the State into the precints of the household, and surrender to Leviathan the most sacred rights of nature.

"If the citizens of a state, on entering into association and fellowship, experienced at the hands of the State hindrance instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of being protected, such association were rather to be repudiated than sought after."

Among the moral powers which man receives from nature itself, the Pope mentions the right of inheritance and that of association. The latter had better be considered in connection with that part of the Encyclical which treats of incomplete societies. The former is mentioned incidentally in the following sentences:

"Nature dictates that a man's children, who carry on, as it were, and continue his own personality, should be provided by him with all that is needful to enable them honorably to keep themselves from want and misery in the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of profitable property, *which he can transmit to his children by inheritance.*"

It is not possible, within the limits of this paper, to treat this important and difficult question. Suffice it to say that the right of inheritance, being derived both from the right of property and from the duties of the head of the household, rests less immediately on nature, and leaves the State more room for interference."

THE CHURCH AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM.

In the solution of the great social problem of the nineteenth century, the influence of the Church is unquestionably the most important factor.

"We approach the subject with confidence," says the sovereign Pontiff, "and in the exercise of the rights which belong to us. For no practical solution of this question will ever be found without the assistance of religion and of the Church. It is we, who are the chief guardian of Revelation and the chief dispenser of what belongs to the Church, and we must not by silence neglect the duty which devolves upon us. Doubtless this most serious question demands the attention and the efforts of others besides ourselves,—of the rulers of states, of employers of labor, of the wealthy, and of the working population themselves, for whom we plead. But we affirm without hesitation that all the striving of men will be vain if they set aside the Church."

A secular paper observed justly that one man only, in the whole world, could use this language without courting ridicule. Leo XIII. used it, and the rulers of states bowed their heads in respect; more than two hundred and twenty-five millions of Catholics treasured up his words; and the rest of the civilized world said with wonder, "Never did man speak like this man."

The first benefit conferred upon the workingman by the pontifical utterance is to show how unsubstantial are the dreams of socialists. "There is nothing more useful than to look at the world as it really is, and at the same time to look elsewhere for a remedy for its troubles." It is because they do not look at the world as it really is, but as they would wish it to be, that men are so easily led astray. The promised equality is impossible; for, if men are equal, insomuch as they have the same *specific* nature, they are widely different with regard to individual qualities, and those differences are the work of nature itself, considered as dwelling in individuals and imparting to them *individual notes* or characteristics. Were it possible, it would not be desirable, for it would destroy the very notion of order, which, accord-

ing to St. Augustine, *is the location of things equal and unequal in their several fitting places.* With order, peace would vanish; for *peace is the tranquillity of order.*[1]

"Such inequality is far from being disadvantageous either to individuals or to the community; social and public life can only go on by the help of various kinds of capacity and the playing of many parts; and each man, as a rule, chooses the part which peculiarly fits his case."

Moreover, could the world be brought down to a dead level, progress would be at an end; for men would have no hope of rising above their present condition, no incentive to save, no model to imitate, no greatness to achieve. "As regards bodily labor, even had man never fallen from *the state of innocence*, he would not have been wholly unoccupied," but labor and delight would have remained united. Sin has severed their companionship, and pain has taken the place of pleasure, or at least dogged the steps of labor. The consequences of sin are bitter and hard to bear, and they must be with man as long as life lasts. Nor can poverty be stamped out, although it can and must be alleviated. For there will always be misfortunes, diseases, and vices in this world. Let us hear on this subject a standard economist:

"We may hope gradually to confine poverty within narrower limits, without cherishing the illusion that it can be totally stamped out. Charitable institutions, such as insane-asylums, homes for the blind and deaf and dumb, do not diminish the number of these unfortunates, but make their lives both secure and bearable. Sometimes those institutions even enable some of their inmates to earn their own living. Mutual help societies, savings banks, insurance companies, the propagation of sound economic principles, a good practical education, etc., will, in time, lessen the misery which is caused by accidents, miscalculations, and lesser vices of men. Yet there will always be an element that will bid defiance to social reform. There will always remain a rebellious element which social reforms cannot eliminate—it is the destitution brought on by incurable sloth, wastefulness, unlawful pleasures and drunkenness. Against it all human efforts will prove unavailing. We can lop off the branches, we shall never kill the root. *On peut l'entamer*

[1] De Civitate Dei, B. XIX., ch. xiii.

on ne parviendra pas á le supprimer. Hence these words will ever be true: 'The poor you have always with you.'[1] Such is the concurrent testimony of common sense, political economy, history and revelation."

The same men who have tried to "cheat the people with lying promises" have also attempted to stir a strife between capital and labor. That the antagonism, which is but too real, must have originated in ignorance and cupidity is evident to any sensible man. Capital is but the produce of preceding labor, it depends on more labor for its productiveness. At the present time, when the wants of men are multiplying, and when production *must increase*, in order to keep pace with consumption, what could labor produce without capital, and what could capital accomplish without labor? The harmonious combination of both is essential, not only for the welfare, but even for the preservation of the human race. To bring about this harmony religion has a wonderful power, and in exercising its power it becomes indirectly a source of wealth. "It teaches the laboring man to carry out honestly and well all equitable agreements freely made." This is but justice. Yet to do it *well* involves something more; it requires *good will*, which has its source in charity. The workman must abstain not only from injuring the capital, or doing harm to the person of his emyloyer, but even from employing violence in representing his own cause. He must not engage in riot or disorder; he must have nothing to do "with men of evil principles, who raise foolish hopes which usually end in disaster and in repentance, when too late." "Religion teaches the employer that their work people are not slaves," much less *machines*. The capitalist must "respect in every man his dignity" as a man and as a christian, and appreciate the true nobility of human labor. It is not enough for him to be *strictly just*. He must love the workingman as a brother, and promote his interest both temporal and spiritual. To tax him beyond his strength, to exercise pressure for

[1] Leroy-Beaulieu, Précis d'Economie Politique, Part IV. Chapter 3.

the sake of gain, as for instance by what they call the *sweating system*, to defraud him of his wages or cut him down to starvation figures, would bring upon the employer the avenging anger of Heaven.

Such are the teachings of the Church. Let their light be turned fully on two maxims, which, in this age of fierce competition, are too often heard from the lips of men who are better than their own principles. The first is that labor is nothing more than *a commodity*, that is to say, so much muscle or physical power to be bought or sold at its market price. Were man a mere machine, this might be true; but the work of man is directly controlled by his intellect and will; it is a free activity, governed by moral laws, not by material laws; it has a worth of its own, not to be found in machine labor; it is *a benefit conferred*, just as the payment of wages is both a compensation and a kindness. The maxim which we condemn is even an economical blunder. A commodity is a product, the labor of man is productive; a commodity retains its value, at least for a time, labor does not keep, if unemployed it is lost. The value of a commodity is not increased or diminished at will by its owner: the value of man's work depends in a great measure on the will that controls it. The good-will, the cheerfulness of the workman may not be calculated according to a mathematical formula; but who would seriously maintain that these elements have nothing to do, either with the quantity, or with the worth of the produce? On the part both of the workingman and the employer, religion insists on two things,—justice and charity. Justice is *necessary*, but it is not sufficient to carry out fully the evangel of love.

Another maxim, equally objectionable, is that corporations have no soul. Why should they have no soul? Are they dead things or living organisms? Are they not moral persons, bound by contracts, amenable to divine, to natural, and to civil law? Are they not lesser societies existing within the Commonwealth? Must the Commonwealth also

be without a soul? The answer to all these questions is plain enough: A corporation, as well as an individual, must act like a just man, an honorable man, a charitable man. Let us add that those who hold in theory the objectionable doctrine frequently discard it in practice.

The unequal contest between wealth and poverty is even more bitter than the artificial antagonism of Capital and Labor. No doubt, there is a great deal of benevolence, nay, of true Christian charity, among the wealthy; but it cannot be denied that riches often make their owner purse-proud, grasping, and callous to human misery. On the other hand, charity and other virtues, rising at times to the sublimity of heroism, are far more common among the poor than those would suppose who are not in touch with them; yet it is true that many among the disinherited fall a prey to envy, covetousness, and vice. Both riches and poverty have their temptations. What is the remedy? Chiefly a moral one. If men be not improved, better institutions will be of no avail. Man is not made virtuous by statute. But to improve men morally, there is no power equal to religious influence. The Church teaches that all men are the children of God and the brothers of Christ. All are equal, insomuch as they have the same principle and the same end, the same specific nature, the same supernatural destiny. This is not the equality dreamed of by those who delude themselves with the hope of blotting out the traces of human sorrow. Suffering and poverty have their mission and their significance; both are hallowed by the memories of Bethlehem, of Nazareth, and of the Golgotha. How blind are the men who strive to tear from the breast of the poor the belief that the Carpenter of Nazareth was the Son of God! They fain would shut out the ray of light that seeks the humblest hovels, to make them radiant with heavenly hopes, and with the glory of the Word Incarnate.

On the poor the Church enjoins patience, resignation and love; it forbids coveteousness and envy; it holds out to the

needy the hope of an eternal reward; but it is not so occupied with the spiritual concerns of its children as to neglect their interests temporal and earthly. Its desire is that the poor should rise above poverty and wretchedness, and should better their condition in life. One thing is poverty freely chosen or patiently endured; another is destitution brought on by vice or idleness. By teaching morality, thrift, and self-restraint, the Church places the poor in the best economic conditions to improve their temporal prospects. Moreover, it intervenes directly in the interest of the poor "by setting on foot and keeping up many things which it sees to be efficacious in the relief of poverty. Here again it has always succeeded so well that it has even extorted the praises of its enemies."

The sovereign Pontiff prefers private charity before State-relief, because "no human methods will ever supply for the devotion and self-sacrifice of Christian chafity." Many economists have reached the same conclusion from other starting-points. State-relief is extremely wasteful, encourages idleness, and often turns into political jobbery.

The Church is no less emphatic in proclaiming the duties of the rich. They are the stewards of God. This expression has been misunderstood by some, who held that with regard to earthly possessions, men had no real ownership, but merely a right of usufruct. The reverse is taught in the Encyclical. Man enjoys a true ownership, though a derived and conditional one. It is necessary to hold private property, but *in the use of it* man must remember that his ownership is a participation in the supreme domain of God. "If the question be asked, How must one's possessions be used? the Church replies, *Man should not consider his outward possessions as his own, but as common to all, so as to share them without difficulty when others are in need.*" In the ordinary duties of charity, a great deal must be left to the promptings of the heart; hence, it is impossible to determine strictly the proportion of the alms to the yearly surplus of the donor. But

St. Alphonsus considers two per cent. as the minimum that will meet the strict requirements of the law, and Roncaglia, one of the authorities quoted by the holy Doctor, thinks that this opinion is too lenient for the rich, and says that the wealthy should be advised to be on the safe side, and do more for the poor. (St. Alph. Lib. II., Tract iii. 11, 32). (Palmieri, Vol. I., p. 144, note a).[1] Far heavier duties are laid on the beneficed clergy, for church property is the patrimony of the poor. In cases of extreme necessity, that is to say, when the indigent person is in danger of death or of severe and protracted illness, the obligation becomes one of justice. A rich man who would allow a poor man to die of starvation, when a gift or a loan could easily stave off the awful calamity, would have to answer before God for the blood of a brother man. Nor is it enough for Dives to throw a bone to Lazarus: in the destitute man he must acknowledge a brother. What he shall have done unto the poor shall be accounted as done unto Christ Himself.

"Such is the scheme of duties and of rights which is put forth to the world by the Gospel. Would not it seem that strife must quickly cease were society penetrated with ideas like these?"

R. J. Holaind, S. J.

[1] If a tax for the support of the needy be levied by the state or city, the rich man may deduct it from the amount which he is bound to give—Let us observe also that one may avoid *mortal sin*, without perfectly carrying out the full intent of the law of charity.

A QUESTION IN PSYCHOLOGY.

Catholic Manuals of Philosophy. Psychology. By Michael Maher, S. J.

WE do not intend in this paper to review Father Maher's work on Psychology which has attracted so much attention in the philosophical world. This has been done by other and more competent hands. We place the work at the head of this article to serve as a text for some observations on the Origin of Ideas as explained by the Scholastics.

In order to appreciate to its full value the scholastic doctrine of science, it would be necessary to compare it with other theories of knowledge; but as we cannot in the space at our disposal, give an exposition of the different systems invented to explain the origin of ideas, we must content ourselves with a description of the theory of knowledge according to St. Thomas. Every theory has, of course, its difficulties, and we do not disguise the fact that the scholastics are unable to explain everything. What we claim is that their system is more consonant with experience, throws more light on our mental operations, and should, on that account, be adopted in preference to the others. It may be here remarked that there exists among a certain class of philosophers a deeply rooted prejudice against scholasticism. It is said that the medieval doctors should not be followed blindly, and that philosophy is a natural and not an authoritative science. This would seem to imply that the scholastics furnished no reasons or arguments to sustain the opinions they advanced; but it is well known that they were by no means satisfied with mere assertions.

It is quite true that every school of philosophy has a tendency to dogmatize, still, this surely is not a sufficient reason for rejecting the philosophical tradition of past ages.

Innovation is not always beneficial to philosophy, for all innovation is, in a great measure, destructive of unity, which should be the principal feature of every science. To be convinced of this, we need only look back to the time of Descartes who was the leader of that mighty philosophical revolution of the seventeenth century. He sowed the seeds of doubt, the fruit of which appeared in the noxious scepticism of the succeeding age. With these preliminary remarks we pass to the consideration of our question.

The foundations of knowledge had been laid by Aristotle and it remained for the scholastics to complete the edifice. This they did in a masterly manner. Possessed of keen intellects they saw clearly that any system of philosophy contradicting experience and common sense could not be sound. With this in view they did not like many philosophers of our day begin by denying every fact they could not account for.

They were convinced that dogmatism is necessary in some cases to the philosopher who, in his ardent desire to grasp everything, might forget that his intellect has its limits and probably fall into the most extravagant errors.

Man, they argued, is a mixed being: he is not all matter nor all mind: he is subject to the conditions of time and space. This being the case, he must acquire knowledge according to his nature, and on account of the intimate connection between the soul and the corporal organs, the latter must in some manner be brought into play.

In order that every faculty can act, three things are required: the faculty itself, the object, and the conjunction of the faculty with the object. The external object does not, it is clear, enter the mind, nor does the mind go out of the body to reach the object. Hence it is an error to say that we are conscious of the objects around us; for it is not of the objects we are conscious but of the perception of the objects. There must be some communication between the mind and the object, otherwise knowledge becomes impos-

sible. How this communication is effected we will now endeavor to show. The Scholastics did not, like Kant, admit two distinct faculties of the soul, namely, reason and understanding, but included both under the general term "intellect." The intellect according to the schoolmen has two different operations, styled *intellectus agens* and *intellectus possibilis*. The work of the former is to extract, so to speak, whatever is intelligible in the object presented by the senses, and to transmit what it has extracted (namely the species impressæ) to the *intellectus possibilis* which forms the idea. This must be well understood. As we before hinted, nothing under a material form can act upon the mind, and hence the *intellectus agens* dematerializes what it receives from the phantasm, and when the object is stripped of its material properties, it is in an intelligible condition.

The idea then is the result of the perception by the mind of the general properties which it discovers in the object. The idea is not known in itself but it is the means by which we know. What first reaches the intellect is the general notion of *being* or as the Scholastics express it: "quod primum cadit in intellectu est ens." If we admitted that the intellect is subjected to the same affections as the organism, we would be compelled to adopt the system of Locke, who held that ideas are only sensible perceptions, thereby reducing the intellect to the rank of an organic power. The intellect according to the Scholastics communicates its influence to the impression caused by the phantasm. From what has been said, it can be seen in what sense the famous principle of Aristotle, "Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu," is to be taken.

It is clear also that we escape the error of Condillac, for we contend that there is an essential and intrinsic difference between feeling and understanding. Sensible species or what are termed phantasmata are not intelligible, but when acted upon by the intellect they are rendered capable of being understood. Sensations then are not ideas. The

former belong to an organism or rather organic faculty, the latter to a spiritual or inorganic faculty.

By the aid of the senses however an activity superior to sensibility is excited in the soul; but this activity when once excited has no further communication with the sensible faculties. Truth is in reason and not in the senses. As long as the soul is united to the body, we cannot understand except "per conversionem ad phantasmata." In other words the representation of the imagination serves as material for the formation of the idea. The charge brought against us that our system leads to materialism is altogether unfounded; since we draw a wide margin between sensible representation and the intellectual act. Great confusion will arise with regard to our theory if one or two important distinctions are not kept before the mind.

The imagination, we hold always, accompanies the idea, but is not the idea itself. Even the concept we have of God must be portrayed in some manner in our imagination before the mind can grasp it. There is, no doubt, much mystery shrouding the action of the intellect, and the most we can do is merely to speculate.

Let us briefly state and answer a few objections urged against us by Ontologists. "How," they ask, "can abstract knowledge be real and certain. Abstractions by themselves are nullities and lead to nothing: they are mere empty forms, from which it is impossible to get reality." This objection, if well founded, would destroy much of the merit of our theory, but we think that a satisfactory solution of the difficulty can be offered. Abstractions, to be sure, are by themselves empty, but every abstraction, according to the scholastics, is based on a reality, for we admit the objectivity of ideas. If there were nothing existing there could be no abstraction. The intellect cannot work without having something on which to work. In fact the very word abstraction implies the existence of something from which the abstraction is to be made. "But" continues the objector "in

order to abstract, you must first have the idea of being, whereas according to you, the mind is a tabula rasa." It is not necessary, we answer, for the mind to have the idea of being, in order to abstract. All that is required is the faculty which can recognize being whenever it is put in contact with it, and in this recognition of being, the abstraction is already performed. The intellect, it should be remembered, is active not passive. Being is its proper object and this idea of being which it possesses is the result of abstraction. Abstraction, we grant, is an imperfect manner of acquiring knowledge, but in our present condition it is the only manner. The soul on account of being connected with the body cannot use all its power. Our knowledge however, as far as it goes, is true. As our experience widens, the stock of our knowledge increases; our mind becomes as it were enlarged; we arrange what we gather from observation and give method and unity to the information we have received.

The principal object of science then is to classify, to give definitions or in other words to penetrate the essences of things: for if we do not reach what the ancients called the *quidditas* of a thing we are in the world of appearances and of illusions. Real science deals with principles. A confused heap of facts stored up within the treasure-house of our memory does not constitute science properly so-called. Hence all knowledge is not science; but yet all science is knowledge. Here then we have a truth of vital importance. There are many sciences differing in capacity and range. This difference of sciences is completely obliterated by the Pantheists who contend that there is but one science embracing all reality.

Our own consciousness is the best refutation of this opinion which would make men like unto Gods. Nor is the system of the intentionists or ontologists correct. We have, they say, an immediate intuition of God that is of a being possessing all reality. Is it not clear then, that if we

enjoy this blessed privilege, all possibility of error is excluded and furthermore progress is out of the question?

The scholastic theory has been much maligned; but at present there is a marked tendency in the philosophical world outside the Catholic Church to return to it. This is certainly an encouraging sign. The recent appearance of the Catholic Manuals of philosophy by the Jesuits of Stonyhurst will do much to popularize the teachings of St. Thomas on philosophical questions. The different treatises on Logic, The First Principles of Being, Moral Philosophy and Natural Theology are a welcome contribution to our philosophical literature. The Manuals are all excellent. Father Maher in particular has done an immense service to philosophy by his valuable work.

J. J. QUINN.

PROFESSOR BRIGGS ON THE THEOLOGICAL CRISIS.

ACCORDING to the Rev. Charles A. Briggs [1] the real issue of the present theological crisis consists in stripping the doctrine of Holy Scripture and of the Nicene and Apostles' creeds of all traditional dogma. Three great topics in particular: the first things (Bible, Church and reason), the last things (the whole field of eschatology) and the central thing (the person and work of Jesus Christ) will have to undergo this purifying process. [2]

Before we examine the professor's statement, something must be said about his general idea of a theological crisis. From his introductory remarks it appears that theological crisis and religious reformation are identical quantities with

[1] North American Review, July, 1891. p. 102. ff.

[2] Ibid. p. 104.

him. Religious reform he bases on the assumption that the Church has not submitted itself to the guidance of the Holy Spirit; therefore its progress is not normal, nor are its decisions infallible.[1] The various reformations which are recorded in the history of the Church, are nothing but so many reviving influences of the divine Spirit, each of them marking an advance in Christian theology and in Christian life, in such a manner however, that only single sections of the Church are carried along with each movement, and that the whole Christian Church of to-day represents in its divisions every stage of progress since the Apostolic times. Consequently, the present crisis too amounts to nothing more or less than a reviving influence of the divine Spirit; it too implies an advance in Christian theology and Christian life. Still, when we consider matters carefully, the separation of traditional dogma from the stock of revealed truth seems to us no more a positive advance in Christian theology, than the elimination of quack medicines is a positive progress in the science of the physician.

Whatever meanings Professor Briggs may attach to the term "advance in Christian theology," all are reducible to two: an increase of divine revelation and a development of the existing revelation. We shall say a word about both meanings. If new divine revelations may be expected in the Christian dispensation, there is no ground for making the Scripture, the Church and the Reason the only seats of authority in religion, as the Professor does in the third section of his article. In that case, immediate divine revelation would be the safest and the most important channel of divine communication. Again, in this supposition there appears no reason for making the authority of the Scripture supreme, because the immediate voice of God has surely as much authority as the written word of God.

The second manner of progress in Christian theology and

[1] N. A. R. p. 100.

Christian life, consists in a more thorough understanding of the divine revelation given to the Church during the lifetime of the Apostles. This advance may be called a development of doctrine. The statement of the Professor that "in all these controversies the doctrinal statements of the Latin church were real advances in theology" leads us to suppose that such a dogmatic development coincides with his idea of theological progress. But if this be the case, it is hard to see how the reformers, such as Luther and Calvin and Zwingli, can be upheld as men who have advanced the Christian doctrine in any way. It is beyond dispute that the Catholic Church had a more fully developed system of dogma, than any of the reformers have seen fit to adopt into their diverse theological systems. But probably the Catholic development of dogma falls under the class of traditional dogma, and must therefore be swept away from the true doctrine of Bible and early creeds. But who is to be the final judge between merely traditional dogma and the truly revealed doctrine? The seat of authority cannot, in this case, be placed in fallible men, especially in such men as the reformers have been. But take the most favorable case; suppose the reformers to have been such men as Dr. Briggs endeavors to picture them to us; no society will allow its private citizens to introduce amendments in its constitutions, even though these citizens should pretend to understand the constitutions of that state or city better, than they had been understood before their time.

And what is, after all, the true place of Bible and early creeds in the Christian dispensation? can the whole stock of revealed truth be limited to them with any show of reason? The several books which now make up the New Testament were composed probably between 54 and 98 A. D. Until that time the Church had been guided by oral teaching under the immediate supervision of Christ and his Apostles. Whatever has been written, is rather an outcome of the doctrine and the law which the Church

already possessed, than their source and motive. It is nowhere stated in these most ancient documents of Christianity that men were to take the writings of the Apostles for their sole rule of faith and discipline; the Bible is nowhere represented as the sole repository of divine revelation; nowhere is it said that the Apostles had written down all that is essential for the true believers, or all they had taught by word of mouth. The writings of St. Paul teach us the contrary: at the end of his earthly course he refers St. Timothy not to what he himself or any of the other Apostles had written, but to what they had taught orally; that doctrine Timothy was to hand on to trustworthy men, to be faithfully preserved and imparted.[1] Oral tradition, therefore, appeared to St. Paul the fittest means of securing to after generations the pure and genuine Christian doctrine. Even where he refers to one of his earlier epistles, he gives the first place to what he had taught by word of mouth as the richer source of information.[2]

Nor does an examination of the early creeds lead to results more favorable to Professor Briggs. Who can give us the assurance that their divers articles contain revealed truth? They must be considered as such either on the authority of the then existing Church, or on its testimony. If the early Church had authority to formulate its articles of faith, where and when did it lose the same? Why did it not possess such a power at the time of the Vatican council, if it did possess the power in the council of Nice? Or if the early creeds be received not on the authority of the early Church, but on its testimony, this testimony can in the case of the council of Nice confirm only the then existing general belief that certain articles had been revealed. The Arians, it must be remembered, did not share this belief. If then in the fourth century the general belief of the Church, excepting her wayward chil-

[1] 2. Tim. II, 14.

[2] 2. Thess. II, 14.

dren, is to be followed as a criterion of revealed doctrine, what prevents us from following the general belief of the same Church, excepting again her wayward children, even now in the nineteenth century? The present theological crisis is therefore illogical, to say the least, in rejecting all traditional dogma, and receiving, at the same time, the Bible and the Apostles' and Nicene creeds as containing truly revealed doctrine.

We now proceed to examine the special points in which, according to Professor Briggs, traditional dogma must be cleared away from the Bible and the early creeds. As to the seat of authority mentioned among the "first things," it may be observed that the Professor rightly supposes the existence of a higher unity in which the triple authority of Bible, Church and Reason may be reconciled. By reason men are brought to know the existence of God and of all such truths as are requisite, before they can pass into the number of believers. But reason alone will never suffice to bring us into that communion with God which is the end and aim of the Christian dispensation. For what comes to us by reason *alone*, we know, and cannot, in so far, believe. "For knowledge is of things we see," while in the supernatural order "we have but faith: we cannot know." The Apostle insists on the same truth: "without faith it is impossible to please God."[1] Reason therefore leads us to the Church, and the Church introduces us into the fulness of revealed truth, whether it be written or unwritten. The higher unity between reason, Church and Bible is therefore a unity of subordination. We pass over this point without further comment, since it belongs rather to dogmatic theology than to the science of Sacred Scripture which is the field in which Dr. Briggs excels.

But even in matters of Sacred Scripture Professor Briggs' method is not only unscientific, but is purely illusory. He first of all ignores the true arguments for the inspiration of

[1] Heb. XI, 6.

the Bible, and secondly he explains the Bible according to his private views without having or giving the slightest assurance of their correctness. Both points must be considered in detail.

Regarding the grounds for the inspiration of the Bible the Professor writes: "We determine the inspiration of the writer from the inspiration of the book, and we determine the inspiration of the book from its internal character and the voice of the Holy Spirit speaking in it to the believer."[1] If then we show that neither the internal character of the Bible nor the voice of the Holy Spirit speaking in it to the believer, are sufficient reasons for its inspiration, we prove our first statement regarding the Professor's ignoring the true arguments for that truth.

Those who appeal to the internal character of the canonical books as a criterion of their inspiration, usually have recourse to the so-called historical, or the aesthetic or finally the psychological test. If the first test, which consists in the narration of miracles and prophecies, be appealed to, it cannot be proved to exist in all canonical books nor in the canonical books alone. Besides, miracles and prophecies may require God's special intervention that they may exist, but they do not require God's special inspiration that they may be recorded. If miracles are worked in confirmation of a doctrine, they show that the doctrine is infallibly true but they do not prove that the book containing that doctrine is inspired.

To understand this last point well, it must be kept in mind that infallibility and inspiration are not identical. Whatever is inspired is infallibly true, but not all infallible truth is inspired. Holy Scripture itself gives us the elements of inspiration. St. Paul[2] represents it as an inbreathing of the Holy Spirit upon the human spirit. St. Peter[3] speaks of inspired men as carried along by the Holy

[1] N. A. R. p. 109.

[2] 2. Tim. III, 16.

[3] 2. Pet. I, 21.

Spirit. Combining these elements, we obtain the following notes of inspiration: 1. a suggestion of matter; 2. an impulse to write; 3. a directive assistance preserving the writer from error.

This third element leads us to the examination of another point on which Professor Briggs evidently lays much stress. "The chief struggle, he says, between Biblical criticism and the traditional dogma is about the question of inerrancy. No word of Holy Scripture, no sentence of historical creed, makes this claim for the Bible."[1] It is hard to understand how a man of the Professor's candor and intellectual ability can make such a statement in good faith. If the writers of the canonical books compose their works under the inbreathing of the Holy Ghost and under his special guidance, as the Scripture testifies, they must also be granted the privilege of writing inerrantly. The errors of the sacred writings would be errors of the Holy Spirit. The argument advanced by the Professor against the inerrancy of the Bible, holds equally well against the truthfulness of any book. What would Dr. Briggs say, if we were to urge against his article in the North American Review, that it could not claim to be truthful, because its author does not say anywhere in the article that he tells the truth. I speak here of truthfulness instead of inerrancy, because the errors of the Bible, if indeed there are any, are not mere errors on the part of the Holy Ghost, but they are wilful untruths. We can afford, therefore, to risk our whole Bible on a single error, because we possess metaphysical certainty of the truthfulness of God. If criticism finds any errors in Holy Scripture, and much more so if it finds the number of errors rather increasing than decreasing, we doubt the correctness of its canons, and retain the peaceful conviction of the inerrability of the inspired writers.

Returning now to our examination of the internal tests of inspiration, we must next consider the æsthetic criterion.

[1] N. A. R. p. 109.

It is said to consist in beauty and sublimity of doctrine, and in simplicity and dignity of style. But here the same deficiencies recur which we found in our consideration of the so-called historical criterion. The stated characteristics are not peculiar to the Bible in such a manner as to effect it wholly and alone. Beauty and sublimity of doctrine and sublimity and dignity of style, are hardly found in the genealogical tables and in the descriptive summaries of the Old Testament, while they occur pre-eminently in the Imitation of Christ and the epistles of Ignatius Martyr. Accordingly these latter writings should be classed among the canonical books, while the genealogies and historic summaries should be blotted out from the canon.

The third or psychological criterion of inspiration consists in feelings of confidence and consolation which arise in the heart of the reader while perusing an inspired book. This test the writer in the North American Review seems to prefer to all the other internal characteristics as indicative of inspiration. He quotes the Gallican Confession IV: "We know these books to be canonical and the sure rule of our faith, not so much by the common accord and consent of the church, as by the testimony and inward persuasion of the Holy Spirit, which enables us to distinguish them from the ecclesiastical books." And the Professor himself [1] says: "The same Holy Spirit who guided holy men to produce the writings gives assurance to those who use them that they are the Word of God." In the same way did Luther and Calvin represent the inspiration of the Bible as self-evident. According to Luther inspiration is perceived as we perceive a first principle in philosophy. We know that the book of Josue is inspired, as we know that three plus seven is ten. [2] Calvin thinks that we distinguish between

[1] N. A. R. p. 109.

[2] Streitigkeit mit dem Koenig Heinrich dem VIII, n. 166, Werke, ed. Walch, 1746, t. XIX, col. 128–129.

inspired and uninspired writings, as we distingnish between darkness and light, black and white, sweet and bitter.[1]

But this third characteristic too is an insufficient test of inspiration. It resembles the above criteria in not extending to the whole Bible, on the one hand, and on the other, in extending to several works not inspired. Besides, this criterion is entirely subjective. The epistle of St. James, e. g., appeared to Luther to be of straw, while Calvin thought it to be divinely inspired. Still both Luther and Calvin applied the same test of inspiration.

What has been said of the internal characteristics singly, must be said of them taken collectively. They are not, even collectively, properties belonging to the Bible alone and to every book of the Bible, and cannot, therefore, serve as marks by which to know the whole collection of canonical books; they are too subjective to give any objective certainty of the divine origin of the canonical books, such as is pre-supposed by Christian faith and morality. After the inspiration of the Holy Scripture has been proved by other arguments, the above internal characteristics may serve to confirm us in the acquired knowledge; but they cannot pro duce this conviction by their own strength.

Professor Briggs has shown his logical clear-sightedness in seeking, as he has done, a divine testimony for the inspiration of the canonical books. A moment's reflection convinces us that human testimony is not sufficient in this case. Since the question regards a matter of fact, and not a merely "a priori" principle, either personal experience or testimony must inform us about it. Personal experience cannot be appealed to, because the facts have happened thousands of years ago. Testimony, therefore, is the only way by which to gain certainty concerning them. The nature of inspiration excludes merely human or historical testimony. For the fact that a writer is inspired, is known only to God

[1] Institution de la religion chrestienne, liv. I, ch. vii, n. 2. in 8vo., Lyon, 1565, p. 33.

and to the person inspired, though the latter does not necessarily know his inspired state. Supposing now the most favorable case in which the writer is fully aware of being inspired, even then his testimony to the divine origin of his books is of no avail. Men are deceived in nothing more easily than in the discrimination of the Spirit which moves them. If Mohammed, e. g., was not a deceiver, he was certainly deceived regarding his religious position as a writer. The greatest Saints of God have trembled for fear of being deceived in matters of private revelation and direct inspiration. The blackest crimes have been perpetrated by persons apparently believing themselves to be inspired. Therefore, the testimony of a writer bearing witness in his own case to divine inspiration in composing a book, is not of sufficient weight to become the groundwork of our religious belief. Unless God himself assures that a book is of divine origin, we are always justified in doubting its inspiration.

Catholics possess such a divine testimony for the inspiration of the canonical books in the voice of the Church. The Church received God's testimony regarding the truly inspired books from the Apostles. Assisted and guided by the divine Spirit she has faithfully kept her sacred trust, and has at all times infallibly proposed to her children as articles of divine faith the truths contained in her deposit of divine revelation. If then reason leads us to subject ourselves to the teaching of the Church, the Church will lead us to the full knowledge of the revealed truth.

If modern Evangelicalism builds its canon of inspired books not on the judgment of the nineteenth century, but on the judgment of the second and third centuries, not on the authority of the living Church, but on that of the dead Church, let it produce a single text from Sacred Scripture, a single sentence from the creeds, in which the Church is represented as an infallible teacher or an infallible believer indeed, but in such a manner as to have her infallibility, active or passive, limited to the first two or three centuries.

Nor can they claim to build their canon on the Apostolic origin of the canonical books; for in that case, the gospels of Sts. Mark and Luke, and the Acts have no ground of inspiration. The testimony for the Apostolic origin of the second epistle of St. Peter, for the second and third epistles of St. John, for the epistle of St. Jude and for the Apocalypse is too weak to serve as the foundation for our faith, unless we receive the traditional teaching of the Church as a sufficient proof for their divine origin.

To repeat briefly: Professor Briggs is right in demanding a divine testimony for the inspiration of the Bible; but he has failed to point out the right one. The internal voice of the Holy Ghost to which he appeals is open to fraud and illusion, is not limited to the canonical books, nor does it extend to all of them.

Our second charge against Dr. Briggs is that he interprets the Bible according to his private views without having or giving assurance of their correctness. We need a divine guide not only in the recognition of the inspired books, but also in their right understanding. To take the Holy Scriptures as the only basis upon which Christians should build their faith is purely illusory. Men relying on this means alone have never been unanimous in their religious belief. Not even when assisted by the earliest creeds of the infant Church have they succeeded in avoiding contradictory tenets of belief. The dispute between the Lutherans and Calvinists upon the Eucharistical consecration is a striking illustration of the insufficiency of the Bible for the construction of a complete system of theology.

Nor can it be said that the great advances that have been made these last fifty years in the study and the exegesis of the Holy Scriptures have brought about any increase of faith or any advance in the unity of doctrine. The boasted Biblical theology of which Dr. Briggs speaks as the youngest of the daughters of Biblical science, and which he represents as the most important branch of the same, will be of

little help to understand the inspired books aright. According to the Professor "it has to determine the theology of each document by itself, then to compare the theologies of the documents and ascertain those things in which they agree and those in which they differ."

Now the whole system of Biblical theology, thus understood, rests on sand and leads to no results that are worth the labor expended in arriving at them. First as to the foundation of Biblical theology, it supposes the existence of different theological systems in the different parts of the Bible. These differences, if they exist at all, must affect either the theological principles which express the relation of man to God, or they affect the laws and means which will lead man to his last end.

Keeping in mind that the canonical books are written under the guidance and inspiration of God himself, they cannot contain a difference of principles respecting man's essential relation to his creator. There may be a development of doctrine on this point in the sacred books, but God never will, never can reveal or inspire doctrines that differ from one another. As there is only one true doctrine expressing the relation between father and son, so there is only one true doctrine regarding the relation between creator and creature.

As to the laws and means leading us to our last end, we must distinguish between those that are based on the nature of things and those that are freely established by God. The former cannot differ in various times and places. As the eye, e. g., is everywhere necessary in order to see, and as the intellect is always needed in order to understand, so is faith at all times and everywhere needed in order to perceive and reach our supernatural end. Again, God himself cannot permit words or acts of blasphemy, or deeds of injustice against our neighbor. No difference of Biblical theology can, then, be expected in regard to these laws and means.

But there are also laws and means which are freely established by God. Baptism, e. g., is a means necessary for salvation, but only because God, in his unsearchable decrees, has ordained it so. The ceremonial law of the Old Testament too was founded not on the nature of man or of God, but was freely established by God's will. In these points, then, we may find a difference of teaching at different times, and possibly, in different places. Thus has the ceremonial law of the Synagogue given way to the spiritual law of the Church; the sacraments of the Old Law have yielded to those of the New. But these differences are so clearly set down in the canonical books, that there is hardly any need of a new science to investigate them.

Finally a word about the results of the young science of Biblical theology. According to Professor Briggs the end of the science consists in ascertaining the agreements and the differences of the various systems of theology found in the various documents of the Bible. It remains to be inferred that the object of such a study is to form an eclectic system of theology. But an eclectic system of theology cannot be a revealed theology; and therefore it is not a system of theology that supposes or implies faith, or that leads us to our supernatural end. Besides, an eclectic system is by its very nature subjective; it implies a more or less arbitrary selection of Bible interpretation, precisely such as we have ascribed to Dr. Briggs.

If the Professor denies that his object is to form an eclectic system, his result will be the mere knowledge of different theological theories, all of which are according to him contained in the canonical books of the Holy Scriptures. And which of these is the true theory? which is the truth that will lead its adherents to eternal salvation? Here the heart is pierced with the agony of doubt, here the science of Biblical theology, such as Professor Briggs has described it, appears in its true light; it is but a broken reed which gives to all who lean on it a shock and a fall.

We must not, however, be understood to underrate the study of dogma in its Biblical expression and development. The more thoroughly it is studied, the more clearly will appear the rock-foundations of the Church and of its dogmatic tenets; the less this study is prosecuted, the more will our faith be exposed to the hollow assaults of the unbeliever and the base sneers of the scoffer. "I beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God, that you present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto God, *your reasonable service*." [1]

A. J. MAAS, S. J.

TITULARS IN SEPTEMBER.

I. NATIVITY OF THE B. V. M. (SEPTEMBER 8.)

Sept. 8. Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. sine com. S. Adrian. Reliq. ut in Calend. per tot. Oct.

II. HOLY NAME OF MARY (SEPTEMBER 13.)

Sept. 13. Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. Com. Dom. Per reliq. dies pro utroq. Clero fit com. Oct. et in die Octava de ea nihil fit ob fest. Sept. Dolor.

III. EXALTATION OF THE H. CROSS (SEPTEMBER 14).

(*Churches dedicated to the H. Cross celebrate their Title on the 3d of May*).

Sept. 14. Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. Nulla com. Per reliq. dies fit com. Oct. et de hac in festo S. Matth. fit ut simplex. *Pro Clero Romano* idem.

IV. SS. CORNELIUS AND CYPRIAN (SEPTEMBER 16).

Sept. 16. Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. 9. Lect. et com. Fer. tant. Fit com. Oct. except. 21. Sept. Fest. S. Lini figend. 25. Sept. et *pro Clero Romano* 3. Oct.

[1] Rom. XII, 1.....

V. ST. CYPRIAN (SEPTEMBER 16).

(See Eccl. Rev. 1890).

VI. FEAST OF THE SEVEN DOLORS (SEPTEMBER 20).

Sept. 20. Dupl. 1. cl. cum Oct. Pro utroq. Clero ut in Calend. cum com. Dom. tant. De Oct. nihil fit 21. Sept. sed celebr. pro Calend. commun. 25, et 26. Sept. fit de die Octava 27. Sept. cum com. Dom. et SS. Mart.

VII. ST. MATTHEW (SEPTEMBER 21).

Sept. 21. Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. de qua fit 25, et 26 Sept. reliq. dieb. com. ut *pro Clero Romano* per tot. Oct. Ex die Octava movend. S. Wencesl. in 3. Oct. pro utroq. Calend.

VIII. ST. THOMAS A VILLANOVA (SEPTEMBER 22).

Sept. 22. Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. de qua fit 25, et 26. Sept. reliq. dieb. et tot. Oct. *pro Clero Romano* fit eius com. De die Octava fit ut simplex ob fest. S. Michael.

IX. ST. MAURICE (SEPTEMBER 22d).

Ubi S. Mauritiu solus est patronus, nihil fit de ejus sociis S. Thom. permanent. figend. 25. Sept. *pro Clero Romano* 3. Oct.

Sept. 22, Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. quæ celebrat. ut Oct. S. Thom. supra.

X. OUR LADY OF MERCY (SEPTEMBER 24th).

Sept. 24, Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. de qua fit 25. et 26. Sept. relig. dieb ejus com. ut *pro Clero Romano* per tot. Oct. except. 29. Sept. De die Oct. fit 1. Oct. cum com. S. Remig. ut simpl. et *pro Clero Romano* remotione S. Gregor. in 3. Oct.

XI. ST. WENCESLAS (SEPTEMBER 28th).

Sept 28, Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. de qua nihil 29. Sept. et 4. Oct. sed de qua fit in utroq. Calend. 3. Oct. Ex die Octava ulterius transferend. S. Francisc. in 7. Oct. et *pro Clero Romano* S. Galla figend 12. Oct. unde movend. S. Franc. in 21. Oct.

XII. ST. MICHAEL AND THE HOLY ANGELS (SEPTEMBER 29th).

Sept. 29, Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. de qua fit 3. Oct. et nihil 4. Oct. Ex die Octava movend. S. Bruno in 7. Oct. et *pro Clero Romano* in 12. Oct. unde ulterius hoc anno ulterius transferend. S. Francisc. in 21. Oct.

XIII. ST. JEROME (SEPTEMBER 30th).

Sept. 30, Dupl. 1. cl. cum oct. de qua fit 3. Oct. et commemor. reliq. dieb. except. 4. Oct. Ex die Octava *pro Clero Romano* perpetuo movend. S. Marc. in 12. Oct. unde ulterius hoc anno transfe rend. S. Francisc. in 21. Oct.

H. GABRIELS.

CONFERENCE.

Proposal for a Shorter Sunday Office.

A reverend correspondent calls our attention to the fact that the secular clergy of Chili have a votive office of the *Holy Trinity* which they are allowed to say on Sundays whenever the office is *de ea* (with some few exceptions). The writer adds: "Ought not our overburdened parish priests, with whom Sunday is such a full day, have this privilege? It could be had for the asking and would be highly appreciated." . . . .

It is difficult to say why the privilege mentioned above has never been sought for in the United States. Probably the fact that a considerable portion of our clergy recite the *Roman* office in which, owing to the more frequent occurrence of feasts, there are fewer Sunday offices, has prevented united action of the bishops in this matter. The votive offices which we say on Thursdays and Saturdays were originally obtained for the benefit of our missionaries in order to avoid the long ferial offices, and Cincinnati with its dependent dioceses secured the *Roman* office for similar reasons. But the large majority of our clergy, who do not enjoy the local or personal privilege of the *Roman* office, are obliged to recite the longest *Hours* on what is practically the shortest day with us. This is not the case in Catholic countries, especial-

ly in Europe, where there are on the whole fewer vacant Sundays owing to the number of local patrons and titulars in benificed churches; hence there would be no reason to make a change in the general Calendar of the Church. In the United States, and missionary countries which are similarly conditioned, it is very different. Saturdays and Sundays are the busiest days with the rank and file of our clergy. The confessional makes it generally impossible to *anticipate* Matins with its eighteen psalms and Lauds, so that frequently the entire office has to be said on Sunday evenings when the mind and body are fatigued.

We take the liberty of bringing this matter to the notice of the Rt. Reverend Ordinaries in the United States, who could easily authorize a joint petition to the Propaganda so as to obtain what would unquestionably be a great benefit to our priests. That the S. Congregation is disposed to grant this privilege, especially on such reasonable grounds as the above, cannot be doubted. "Qui particularia officia recitare desiderant, instent pro illorum approbatione et concessione." (Decr. auth. N. 4134).

Removal of the Mensa of a Consecrated Altar.

Qu. In cleaning the main altar of our Church (which is consecrated), I noticed that the cement which joins the *mensa* to the base is crumbling away. Would the altar be desecrated (require new consecration) if we were to lift the mensa, without wholly removing it, in order to put fresh cement beneath the joints, for I fear the slab is loosening all around?

Resp. The separation of the *mensa* from the base (stipites) practically breaks the altar, which in that case would require new consecration. This appears to hold good even where the slab is not entirely removed. In answer to a *dubium* regarding the reconsecration of altars in which the cement surrounding the "sepulchrum" has become loose, the S. Congregation wrote: "Si sepulchrum apertum non fuerit, sed tantummodo de novo cœmento firmatum, negative (i. e.

non indiget nova consecratione); secus affirmative." Afterwards a new doubt was proposed with reference to the above: *Hæc decisio potestne etiam retineri cum tota mensa altaris consecrati ad modum fixi e suis stipitibus sublevata, non omnino dimota, novo cœmento ipsis stipitibus firmatur et conjungitur.* To this the S. Congr. of Rites replied: *Negative.*

(S. R. C. Die 23 Febr. 1884.)

ANALECTA.

DECRETA DE CRANIOTOMIA.

Dubium quoad operationem chirurgicam quæ "Craniotomia" audit.

I.

Eme et Rme Dne,

Emi PP. mecum Inquisitores Generales in Congregatione habita Feria IV., die 28 labentis Maii, ad examen revocarunt dubium ab Eminentia tua propositum—An tuto doceri possit in scholis catholicis licitam esse operationem chirurgicam, quam Craniotomiam appellant, quando scilicet, ea omissa, mater et infans perituri sint, ea e contra admissa, salvanda sit mater infante pereunte?—Ac omnibus diu et mature perpensis, habita quoque ratione eorum quæ hac in re a peritis catholicis viris conscripta ac ab Eminentia tua huic Congregationi transmissa sunt, respondendum esse duxerunt: Tuto doceri non posse.

Quam responsionem cum SSmus D. N. in audientia ejusdem feriæ ac diei plene confirmaverit, Eminentiæ tuæ communico, tuasque manus humillime deosculor.

Romæ 31 Maii 1884.

Emo Archiepiscopo Lugdunensi. Humillimus et addictissimus servus verus

R. Card. Monaco.

II.

Anno 1886, Amplitudinis tuæ prædecessor dubia nonnulla huic supremæ Congregationi proposuit circa liceitatem quarundam operationum chirurgicarum craniotomiæ adfinium. Quibus sedulo perpensis, Eminentissimi ac Reverendissimi Patres Cardinales una mecum Inquisitores Generales, feria IV., die 14 currentis mensis respondendum mandaverunt:

"In scholis catholicis tuto doceri non posse licitam esse operationem chirurgicam quam craniotomiam appellant, sicut declaratum fuit die 28 Maii 1884, et quamcumque chirurgicam operationem directe occisivam fœtus vel matris gestantis."

Idque notum facio Amplitudini tuæ ut significes professoribus facultatis medicæ Universitatis catholicæ Insulensis.

Interim fausta quæque ac felicia tibi a Domino precor.

Romæ, die 18 Augusti 1889.

Amplitudinis Tuæ

Addictissimus in Domino

R. Card. Monaco.

Reverendissimo Domino Archiepiscopo Cameracensi.

ANALECTA.

SANCTISSIMI DOMINI NOSTRI.

LEONIS

DIVINA PROVIDENTIA

PAPAE XIII.

LITTERÆ ENCYCLICÆ

AD PATRIARCHAS, PRIMATES, ARCHIEPISCOPOS ET EPISCOPOS UNIVERSOS CATHOLICI ORBIS GRATIAM ET COMMUNIONEM CUM APOSTOLICA SEDE HABENTES.

DE CONDITIONE OPIFICUM.

(*Continuantur*).

Sed illud præterea considerandum, quod rem altius attingit, unam civitatis esse rationem, communem summorum atque infimorum. Sunt nimirum proletarii pari jure cum locupletibes naturâ cives, hoc est partes veræ vitamque viventes, unde constat, interjectis familiis, corpus reipublicæ: ut ne illud adjungatur, in omni urbe eos esse numero longe maximo. Cum igitur illud sit perabsurdum, parti civium consulere, partem negligere, consequitur, in salute commodisque ordinis proletariorum tuendis curas debitas collocari publice oportere: ni fiat, violatum iri justitiam, suum cuique tribuere præcipientem. Qua de re sapienter S. Thomas: *sicut pars et totum quodammodo sunt idem, ita id, quodest totius quadammodo est partis.* [1] Proinde in officiis non paucis neque levibus populo bene consulentium principum, illud in primis eminet, ut unumquemque civium ordinem æquabiliter tueatur, ea nimirum, quæ *distributiva* appellatur, justitiâ inviolate servandâ.

Quamvis autem cives universos, nemine excepto, conferre aliquid in summam bonorum communium necesse sit, quorum aliqua pars virilis sponte recidit in singulos, tamen idem et exæquo conferre nequaquam

[1] II-II. Quæst. LXI, a. I, ad. 2.

possunt. Qualescumque sint in imperii generibus vicissitudines, perpetua futura sunt ea in civium statu discrimina, sine quibus nec esse, nec cogitari societas ulla posset. Omnino necesse est quosdam reperiri, qui e reipublicæ dedant, qui leges condant, qui jus dicant, denique quorum consilio atque auctoritate negotia urbana, res bellicæ administrentur. Quorum virorum priores esse partes, eosque habendos in omni populo primarios, nemo non videt, propterea quod communi bono dant operam proxime atque excellenti ratione. Contra vero qui in arte aliqua exercentur, non eâ, qua illi, ratione nec iisdem muneribus prosunt civitati: sed tamen plurimum et ipsi, quamquam minus direcet, utilitati publicæ inserviunt. Sane sociale bonum cum debeat esse ejusmodi, ut homines ejus fiant adeptione meliores, est profecto in virtute præcipue collocandum. Nihilominus ad bene constitutam civitatem suppeditatio quoque pertinet bonorum corporis atque externorum, *quorum usus est necessarius ad actum virtutis.*[1] Jamvero his pariendis bonis est proletariorum maxime efficax ac necessarius labor, sive in agris artem atque manum, sive in officinis exerceant. Immo eorum in hoc genere vis est atque efficientia tanta, ut illud verissimum sit, non aliunde quam ex opificum labore gigni divitias civitatum. Jubet igitur æquitas curam de proletario publice geri, ut ex eo, quod in communem effert utilitatem, percipiat ipse aliquid, ut tectus, ut vestitus, ut salvus vitam tolerare minus ægre possit. Unde consequitur, favendum rebus omnibus esse quæ conditioni opificum quoquo modo videantur profuturæ. Quæ cura tantum abest ut noceat cuiquam, ut potius profutura sit universis, quia non esse omnibus modis eos miseros, a quibus tam necessaria bona proficiscuntur, prorsus interest reipublicæ.

Non civem, ut diximus, non familiam absorberi a republica rectum est: suam utrique facultatem agendi, cum libertate permittere æquum est, quantum incolumi bono communi et sine cuiusquam iniuria potest. Nihilominus eis, qui imperant, videndum ut communitatem eiusque partes tueantur. Communitatem quidem, quippe quam summæ potestati conservandam natura commisit usque eo, ut publicæ custodia salutis non modo suprema lex sed tota caussa sit ratioque principatus: partes vero, quia procurationem reipublicae non ad utilitatem eorum, quibus commissa est, sed ad eorum, qui commissi sunt, naturâ pertinere, philosophia pariter et fides christiana consentiunt. Cumque imperandi facultas proficiscatur a Deo, eiusque sit communicatio quædam summi

[1] S. Thom. De reg Princip, I. C. XV.

principatus, gerenda ad exemplar est potestatis divinæ, non minus rebus singulis quam universis cura paterna consulentis. Si quid igitur detrimenti allatum sit aut impendeat rebus communibus, aut singulorum ordinum rationibus, quod sanari aut prohiberi alia ratione non possit, obviam iri auctoritate publica necesse est.—Atqui interest salutis cum publicæ, tum privatæ pacatas esse res et compositas: item dirigi ad Dei iussa naturæque principia omnem convictus domestici disciplinam: observari et coli religionem: florere privatim ac publice mores integros: sanctam retineri iustitiam, nec alteros ab alteris impune violari: validos adolescere cives, iuvandæ tutandæque, si res postulet, civitati idoneos. Quamobrem si quando fiat, ut quippiam turbarum impendeat ob secessionem opificum, aut intermissas ex composito operas: ut naturalia familiæ nexa apud proletarios relaxentur: ut religio in opificibus violetur non satis impertiendo commodi ad officia pietatis: si periculum in officinis integritati morum ingruat a sexu promiscuo, aliisve perniciosis invitamentis peccandi: aut opificum ordinem herilis ordo iniquis premat oneribus, vel alienis a persona ac dignitate humana conditionibus affligat: si valetudini noceatur opere immodico, nec ad sexum ætatemve accommodato, his in caussis plane adhibenda, certos intra fines, vis et auctoritas legum. Quos fines eadem, quæ legum poscit opem, caussa determinat: videlicet non plura suscipienda legibus, nec ultra progrediendum, quam incommodorum sanatio, vel periculi depulsio requirat.

Iura quidem, in quocumque sint, sancte servanda sunt: atque ut suum singuli teneant, debet potestas publica providere, propulsandis atque ulciscendis iniuriis. Nisi quod in ipsis protegendis privatorum iuribus, præcipue est infimorum atque inopum habenda ratio. Siquidem natio divitum, suis septa præsidiis, minus eget tutelâ publicâ: miserum vulgus, nullis opibus suis tutum, in patrocinio reipublicæ maxime nititur. Quocirca mercenarios, cum in multitudine egena numerentur, debet curâ providentiâque singulari complecti respublica.

Sed quædam maioris momenti præstat nominatim perstringere.—Caput autem est, imperio ac munimento legum tutari privatas possessiones oportere. Potissimumque, in tanto iam cupiditatum ardore, continenda in officio plebs: nam si ad meliora contendere concessum est non repugnante iustitia, at alteri, quod suum est, detrahere, ac per speciem absurdæ cuiusdam æquabilitatis in fortunas alienas involare, iustitia vetat, nec ipsa communis utilitatis ratio sinit. Utique pars opificum longe maxima res meliores honesto labore comparare sine cuius-

quam iniuria malunt: verumtamen non pauci numerantur pravis imbuti opinionibus rerumque novarum cupidi, qui id agunt omni ratione ut turbas moveant, ac ceteros ad vim impellant. Intersit igitur reipublicæ auctoritas, iniectoque concitatoribus freno, ab opificum moribus corruptrices artes, a legitimis dominis periculum rapinarum cœrceat.

Longinquior vel operosior labos, atque opinatio curtæ mercedis caussam non raro dant artificibus quamobrem opere se solvant ex composito, otioque dedant voluntario. Cui quidem incommodo usitato et gravi medendum publice, quia genus istud cessationis non heros dumtaxat, atque opifices ipsos afficit damno, sed mercaturis obest reique publicæ utilitatibus: cumque haud procul esse a vi turbisque soleat, sæpenumero tranquillitatem publicam in discrimen adducit. Qua in re illud magis efficax ac salubre, antevertere auctoritate legum, malumque ne erumpere possit prohibere, amotis mature caussis, unde dominorum atque operariorum conflictus videatur extiturus.

Similique modo plura sunt in opifice, præsidio munienda reipublicæ: ac primum animi bona. Siquidem vita mortalis quantumvis bona et optabilis, non ipsa tamen illud est ultimum, ad quod nati sumus: sed via tantummodo atque instrumentum ad animi vitam perspicientia veri et amore boni complendam. Animus est, qui expressam gerit imaginem similitudinemque divinam, et in quo principatus ille residet, per quem dominari iussus est homo in inferiores naturas, atque efficere utilitati suæ terras omnes et maria parentia. *Replete terram et subiicite eam: et dominamini piscibus maris et volatilibus cæli et universis animantibus, quæ moventur super terram.*[1] Sunt omnes homines hac in re pares, nec quippiam est quod inter divites atque inopes, inter dominos et famulos inter principes privatosque differat: *nam idem dominus omnium*[2] Nemini licet hominis dignitatem, de qua Deus ipse disponit *cum magna reverentia*, impune violare, neque ad eam perfectionem imperdire cursum, quæ sit vitæ in cælis sempiternæ consentanea. Quinetiam in hoc genere tractari se non convenienter naturæ suæ, animique servitutem servire velle, ne sua quidem sponte homo potest: neque enim de iuribus agitur, de quibus sit integrum homini, verum de officiis adversus Deum, quæ necesse est sancte servari.—Hinc consequitur requies cperum et laborum per festos dies necessaria. Id tamen nemo intelligat de maiore quadam inertis otii usura, multoque minus de

[1] Gen. I, 28.

[2] Rom. X, 12.

cessatione, qualem multi expetunt, fautrice vitiorum et ad effusione, pecuniarum adiutrice, sed omnino de requiete operum per religionem consecrata. Coniuncta cum religione quies sevocat hominem a laboribus negotiisque vitae quotidianæ ut ad cogitanda revocet bona cælestia, tribuendumque cultum numini æterno iustum ac debitum. Hæc maxime natura atque hæc caussa quietis est in dies festos capiendæ : quod Deus et in Testamento veteri præcipua lege sanxit : *memento ut diem sabbati sanctifices*;[1] et facto ipse suo docuit, arcana requiete, statim posteaquam fabricatus hominem erat, sumptâ: *requievit die septimo ab universo opere quod patrarat.*[2]

Quod ad tutelam bonorum corporis et externorum, primum omnium eripere miseros opifices e sævitia oportet hominum cupidorum, personis pro rebus ad quæstum intemperanter abutentium. Scilicet tantum exigi operis, ut hebescat animus labore nimio, unâque corpus defatigationi succumbat, non iustitia, non humanitas patitur. In homine, sicut omnis natura sua, ita et vis efficiens certis est circumscripta finibus, extra quos egredi non potest. Acuitur illa quidem exercitatione atque usu, sed hac tamen lege ut agere intermittat identidem et acquiescat. De quotidiano igitur opere videndum ne in plures extrahatur horas, quam vires sinant. Intervalla vero quiescendi quanta esse oporteat, ex vario genere operis, ex adiunctis temporum et locorum, ex ipsa opificum valetudine iudicandum. Quorum est opus lapidem e terra excindere, aut ferrum, æs, aliaque id genus effodere penitus abdita, eorum labor, quia multo maior est idemque valetudini gravis, cum brevitate temporis est compensandus. Anni quoque dispicienda tempora : quia non raro idem operæ genus alio tempore facile est ad tolerandum, alio aut tolerari nulla ratione potest, aut sine summa difficultate non potest.—Denique quod facere enitique vir adulta ætate beneque validus potest, id a femina puerove non est æquum postulare. Immo de pueris valde cavendum, ne prius officina capiat, quam corpus, ingenium animum satis firmaverit ætas. Erumpentes enim in pueritia vires, velut herbescentem viriditatem, agitatio præcox elidit : qua ex re omnis est institutio puerilis interitura. Sic certa quædam artificia minus apte conveniunt in feminas ad opera domestica natas : quæ quidem opera et tuentur magnopere in muliebri genere decus, et liberorum institutioni prosperitatique familiæ naturâ respondent. Universe autem statuatur, tantum esse opi-

[1] Exod. XX, 8.

[2] Gen. II, 2.

ficibus tribuendum otii, quantum cum viribus compensetur labore consumptis ; quia detritas usu vires debet cessatio restituere. In omni obligatione, quæ dominis atque artificibus invicem contrahatur, hæc semper aut adscripta aut tacita conditio inest, utrique generi quiescendi ut cautum sit : neque enim honestum esset convenire secus, quia nec postulare cuiquam fas est nec spondere neglectum officiorum, quæ vel Deo vel sibimetipsi hominem obstringunt.

Rem hoc loco attingimus sat magni momenti : quæ recte intelligatur necesse est, in alterutram partem ne peccetur. Videlicet salarii definitur libero consensu modus : itaque dominus rei, pacta mercede persoluta, liberavisse fidem, nec ultra debere quidquam videatur. Tunc solum fieri iniuste, si vel pretium dominus solidum, vel obligatas artifex operas reddere totas recusaret : his caussis rectum esse potestatem politicam intercedere, ut suum cuique ius incolume sit, sed præterea nullis.—Cui argumentationi æquus rerum iudex non facile, neque in totum assentiatur, quia non est absoluta omnibus partibus : momentum quoddam rationis abest maximi ponderis. Hoc est enim operari, exercere se rerum comparandarum caussâ, quæ sint ad varios vitæ usus, potissimumque ad tuitionem sui necessariæ. *In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane.*[1] Itaque duas velut notas habet in homine labor naturâ insitas, nimirum ut *personalis* sit, quia vis agens adhæret personæ, atque eius omnino est propria, a quo exercetur, et cuius est utilitati nata : deinde ut sit *necessarius*, ob hanc caussam, quod fructus laborum est homini opus ad vitam tuendam : vitam autem tueri ipsa rerum, cui maxime parendum, natura iubet. Iamvero si ex ea dumtaxat parte spectetur quod personalis est, non est dubium quin integrum opifici sit pactæ mercedis angustius finire modum : quemadmodum enim operas dat ille voluntate, sic et operarum mercede vel tenui vel plane nulla contentus esse voluntate potest. Sed longe aliter iudicandum si cum ratione *personalitatis* ratio coniungitur *necessitatis*, cogitatione quidem non re ab illa separabilis. Reapse manere in vita, commune singulis officium est, cui scelus est deesse. Hinc ius reperiendarum rerum, quibus vita sustentatur, necessario nascitur : quarum rerum facultatem infimo cuique non nisi quæsita labore merces suppeditat. Esto igitur, ut opifex atque herus libere in idem placitum, ac nominatim in salarii modum consentiant : subest tamen semper aliquid ex iustitia naturali, idque libera paciscen-

[1] I. Gen. III, 19.

tium voluntate maius et antiquius, scilicet alendo opifici, frugi quidem et bene morato, haud imparem esse mercedem oportere. Quod si necessitate opifex coactus, aut mali peioris metu permotus duriorem conditionem accipiat, quæ, etiamsi nolit, accipienda sit, quod a domino vel a redemptore operum imponitur, istud quidem est subire vim, cui iustitia reclamat.—Verumtamen in his similibusque caussis, quales illæ sunt in unoquoque genere artificii quotâ sit elaborandum horâ, quibus præsidiis valetudini maxime in officinis cavendum, ne magistratus inferat sese importunius, præsertim cum adiuncta tam varia sint rerum, temporum, locorum, satius erit eas res iudicio reservare collegiorum, de quibus infra dicturi sumus, aut aliam inire viam, qua rationes mercenariorum, uti par est, salvæ sint, accedente, si res postulaverit, tutela præsidioque reipublicæ.

Mercedem si ferat opifex satis amplam ut ea se uxoremque et liberos tueri commodum queat, facile studebit parsimoniæ, si sapit, efficietque, quod ipsa videtur natura monere, ut detractis sumptibus, aliquid etiam redundet, quo sibi liceat ad modicum censum pervenire. Neque enim efficaci ratione dirimi caussam, de qua agitur, posse vidimus, nisi hoc sumpto et constituto, ius privatorum bonorum sanctum esse oportere. Quamobrem favere huic iuri leges debent, et, quoad potest, providere ut quamplurimi ex multitudine rem habere malint. Quo facto, præclarâ utilitates consecuturæ sunt : ac primum certe æquior partitio bonorum. Vis enim commutationum civilium in duas civium classes divisit urbes, immenso inter utramque discrimine interiecto. Ex una parte factio præpotens, quia prædives : quæ cum operum et mercaturæ universum genus sola potiatur, facultatem omnem copiarum effectricem ad sua commoda ac rationes trahit, atque in ipsa administratione reipublicæ non parum potest. Ex altera inops atque infirma multitudo, exulcerato animo et ad turbas semper parato. Iamvero si plebis excitetur industria in spem adipiscendi quippiam, quod solo contineatur, sensim fiet ut alter ordo evadat finitimus alteri, sublato inter summas divitias summamque egestatem discrimine.—Præterea rerum, quas terra gignit, maior est abundantia futura. Homines enim, cum se elaborare sciunt in suo, alacritatem adhibent studiumque longe maius : immo prorsus adamare terram instituunt sua manu percultam, unde non alimenta tantum, sed etiam quamdam copiam et sibi et suis expectant. Ista voluntatis alacritas, nemo non videt quam valde conferat ad ubertatem fructuum, augendasque divitias civitatis.—Ex quo illud tertio loco manabit

commodi, ut qua in civitate homines editi susceptique in lucem sint, ad eam facile retineantur : neque enim patriam cum externa regione commutarent, si vitæ degendæ tolerabilem daret patria facultatem. Non tamen ad hæc commoda perveniri nisi ea conditione potest, ut privatus census ne exhauriatur immanitate tributorum et vectigalium. Ius enim possidendi privatim bona cum non sit lege hominum sed natura datum, non ipsum abolere, sed tantummodo ipsius usum temperare et cum communi bono componere auctoritas publica potest. Faciat igitur iniuste atque inhumane, si de bonis privatorum plus æquo, tributorum nomine, detraxerit.

Postremo domini ipsique opifices multum hac in caussa possunt, iis videlicet institutis, quorum ope et opportune subveniatur indigentibus, et ordo alter propius accedat ad alterum. Numeranda in hoc genere sodalitia ad suppetias mutuo ferendas: res varias, privatorum providentiâ constitutas, ad cavendum opifici, itemque orbitati uxoris et liberorum, si quid subitum ingruat, si debilitas afflixerit, si quid humanitus accidat: instituti patronatus pueris, puellis, adolescentibus natuque maioribus tutandis. Sed principem locum obtinent sodalitia artificum, quorum complexu fere cetera continentur. Fabrum corporatorum apud maiores nostros diu bene facta constitere. Revera non modo utilitates præclaras artificibus, sed artibus ipsis, quod perplura monumenta testantur, decus atque incrementum peperere. Eruditiore nunc ætate, moribus novis, auctis etiam rebus quas vita quotidiana desiderat, profecto sodalitia opificum flecti ad præsentem usum necesse est. Vulgo coiri eius generis societatis, sive totas ex opificibus conflatas, sive ex utroque ordine mixtas, gratum est: optandum vero ut numero et actuosa virtute crescant. Etsi vero de iis non semel verba fecimus, placet tamen hoc loco ostendere, eas esse valde opportunas, et iure suo coalescere: item qua illas disciplina uti, et quid agere oporteat.

Virium suarum explorata exiguitas impellit hominem atque hortatur, ut opem sibi alienam velit adiungere. Sacrarum litterarum est illa sententia: *melius est duos esse simul, quam unum : habent enim emolumentum societatis suæ. Si unus ceciderit, ab altero fulcietur. Væ soli : quia cum ceciderit, non habet sublevantem se.*[1] Atque illa quoque: *frater, qui adiuvatur a fratre, quasi civitas firma.*[2] Hac homo propensione naturali sicut ad coniunctionem ducitur congregationemque civilem,

[1] Eccl. IV, 9–12.

[2] Prov. XVIII, 19

sic et alias cum civibus inire societates expetit, exiguas illas quidem nec perfectas, sed societates tamen. Inter has et magnam illam societatem ob differentes caussas proximas interest plurimum. Finis enim societati civili propositus pertinet ad universos, quoniam communi continetur bono: cuius omnes et singulos pro portione compotes esse ius est. Quare appellatur *publica* quia per eam *homines sibi invicem communicant in una republica constituenda.*[1] Contra vero, quæ in eius velut sinu iunguntur societates, privatæ habentur et sunt, quia videlicet illud, quo proxime spectant, privata utilitas est, ad solos pertinens consociatos. *Privata autem societas est, quæ ad aliquod negotium privatum exercendum coniungitur, sicut quod duo vel tres societatem ineunt, ut simul negotientur.*[2] Nunc vero quamquam societates privatæ existunt in civitate, eiusque sunt velut partes totidem, tamen universe ac per se non est in potestate reipublicæ ne existant prohibere. Privatas enim societates inire concessum est homini iure naturæ: est autem ad præsidium iuris naturalis instituta civitas, non ad interitum: eaque si civium cœtus sociari vetuerit, plane secum pugnantia agat, propterea quod tam ipsa quam cœtus privati uno hoc e principio nascuntur, quod homines sunt natura congregabiles.—Incidunt aliquando tempora cum ei generi communitatum rectum sit leges obsistere: scilicet si quidquam ex instituto persequantur, quod cum probitate, cum iustitia, cum rēipublicæ salute aperte dissideat. Quibus in caussis iure quidem potestas publica, quo minus illæ coalescant, impediet: iure etiam dissolvet coalitas: summam tamen adhibeat cautionem necesse est, ne iura civium migrare videatur, neu quidquam per speciem utilitatis publicæ statuat, quod ratio non probet. Eatenus enim obtemperandum legibus, quoad cum recta ratione adeoque cum lege Dei sempiterna consentiant.[3]

Sodalitates varias hic reputamus animo et collegia et ordines religiosos, quos Ecclesiæ auctoritas et pia christianorum voluntas genuerant: quanta vero cum salute gentis humanæ, usque ad nostram memoriam historia loquitur. Societates eiusmodi, si ratio sola diiudicet, cum initæ honestâ caussâ sint, iure naturali initas apparet fuisse. Qua vero parte religionem attingunt, sola est Ecclesia cui iuste pareant. Non

[1] S. Thom. *Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem*, cap. II.

[2] Ib.

[3] *Lex humana in tantum habet rationem legis, in quantum est secundum rationem rectam, et secundum hoc manifestum est quod a lege æterna deviratur. In quantum vero a ratione recedit, sic dicitur lex iniqua, et sic non habet rationem legis, sed magis violentiæ cuiusdam.* (S. Thom. Summ. Theol. I-II, Quæst. XIII, a. III).

igitur in eas quicquam sibi arrogare iuris, nec earum ad se traducere administrationem recte possunt qui præsint civitati: eas potius officium est reipublicæ vereri, conservare, et, ubi res postulaverint, iniuriâ prohibere. Quod tamen longe aliter fieri hoc præsertim tempore vidimus. Multis locis communitates huius generis respublica violavit, ac multiplici quidem iniuria: cum et civilium legum nexo devinxerit, et legitimo iure personæ moralis exuerit, et fortunis suis despoliarit. Quibus in fortunis suum habebat Ecclesia ius, suum singuli sodales, item qui eas certæ cuidam caussæ addixerant, et quorum essent commodo ac solatio addictæ. Quamobrem temperare animo non possumus quin spoliationes eiusmodi tam iniustas ac perniciosas conqueramur, eo vel magis quod societatibus catholicorum virorum, pacatis iis quidem et in omnes partes utilibus, iter præcludi videmus, quo tempore edicitur, utique coire in societatem per leges licere: eaque facultas large revera hominibus permittitur consilia agitantibus religioni simul ac reipublicæ perniciosa.

Profecto consociationum diversissimarum, maxime ex opificibus, longe nunc maior, quam alias frequentia. Plures unde ortum ducant, quid velint, qua grassentur via, non est huius loci quærere. Opinio tamen est, multis confirmata rebus, præesse ut plurimum occultiores auctores, eosdemque disciplinam adhibere non christiano nomini, non saluti civitatum consentaneam: occupataque efficiendorum operum universitate, id agere ut qui secum consociari recusarint, luere pœnas egestate cogantur.—Hoc rerum statu, alterutrum malint artifices christiani oportet, aut nomen collegiis dare, unde periculum religioni extimescendum: aut sua inter se sodalitia condere, viresque hoc pacto coniungere, quo se animose queant ab illa iniusta ac non ferenda oppressione redimere. Omnino optari hoc alterum necesse esse, quam potest dubitationem apud eos habere, qui nolint summum hominis bonum in præsentissimum discrimen coniicere?

Valde quidem laudandi complures ex nostris, qui probe perspecto quid a se tempora postulent, experiuntur ac tentant qua ratione proletarios ad meliora adducere honestis artibus possint. Quorum patrocinio suscepto, prosperitatem augere cum domesticam tum singulorum student: item moderari cum æquitate vincula, quibus invicem artifices et domini continentur: alere et confirmare in utrisque memoriam officii atque evangelicorum custodiam præceptorum; quæ quidem præcepta, hominem ab intemperantia revocando, excedere modum vetant, perso-

narumque et rerum dissimillimo statu harmoniam in civitate tuentur. Hac de caussa unum in locum sæpe convenire videmus viros egregios, quo communicent consilia invicem, viresque iungant, et quid maxime expedire videatur, consultent. Alii varium genus artificum opportuna copulare societate student; consilio ac re iuvant, opus ne desit honestum ac fructuosum, provident. Alacritatem addunt ac patrocinium impertiunt Episcopi: quorum auctoritate auspiciisque plures ex utroque ordine Cleri, quæ ad excolendum animum pertinent, in consociatis sedulo curant. Denique Catholici non desunt copiosis divitiis, sed mercenariorum velut consortes voluntarii, qui constituere lateque fundere grandi pecunia consociationes adnitantur: quibus adiuvantibus facile opifici liceat non modo commodo præsentia, sed etiam honestæ quietis futuræ fiduciam sibi labore quærere. Tam multiplex tamque alacris industria quantum attulerit rebus communibus boni plus est cognitum, quam ut attineat dicere. Hinc iam bene de reliquo tempore sperandi auspicia sumimus, modo societates istiusmodi constanter incrementa capiant, ac prudenti temperatione constituantur. Tutetur hos respublica civium cœtus iure sociatos: ne trudat tamen sese in eorum intimam rationem ordinemque vitæ: vitalis enim motus cietur ab interiore principio, ac facillime sane pulsu eliditur externo.

Est profecto temperatio ac disciplina prudens ad eam rem necessaria ut consensus in agendo fiat conspiratioque voluntatum. Proinde si libera civibus cœundi facultas est, ut profecto est, ius quoque esse oportet eam libere optare disciplinam easque leges, quæ maxime conducere ad id, quod propositum est, iudicentur. Eam, quæ memorata est temperationem disciplinamque collegiorum qualem esse in partibus suis singulis oporteat, decerni certis definitisque regulis non censemus posse, cum id potius statuendum sit ex ingenio cuiusque gentis, ex periclitatione et usu, ex genere atque efficientia operum, ex amplitudine commerciorum, aliisque rerum ac temporum adiunctis, quæ sunt prudenter ponderanda. Ad summam rem quod spectat, hæc tanquam lex generalis ac perpetua sanciatur, ita constitui itaque gubernari opificum collegia oportere, ut instrumenta suppeditent aptissima maximeque expedita ad id, quod est propositum, quodque in eo consistit ut singuli e societate incrementum bonorum corporis, animi, rei familiaris, quoad potest, assequantur. Perspicuum vero est, ad perfectionem pietatis et morum tanquam ad caussam præcipuam spectari oportere: eâque potissimum caussâ disciplinam socialem penitus dirigendam. Secus enim

degenerarent in aliam formam, eique generi collegiorum, in quibus nulla ratio religionis haberi solet, haud sane multum præstarent. Ceterum quid prosit opifici rerum copiam societate quæsisse, si ob inopiam cibi sui de salute periclitetur anima? *Quid prodest homini, si mundum universum lucretur, animæ vero suæ detrimentum patiatur?*[1] Hanc quidem docet Christus Dominus velut notam habendam, qua ab ethnico distinguatur homo christianus; *hæc omnia gentes inquirunt....quærite primum regnum Dei, et iustitiam eius, et hæc omnia adiicientur vobis.*[2] Sumptis igitur a Deo principiis, plurimum eruditioni religiosæ tribuatur loci, ut sua singuli adversus Deum officia cognoscant: quid credere oporteat, quid sperare atque agere salutis sempiternæ caussâ, probe sciant: curâque præcipuâ adversus opinionum errores variasque corruptelas muniantur. Ad Dei cultum studiumque pietatis excitetur opifex, nominatim ad religionem dierum festorum colendam. Vereri diligereque communem omnium parentem Ecclesiam condiscat: itemque eius et obtemperare præceptis et sacramenta frequentare, quæ sunt ad expiandas animi labes sanctitatemque comparandam instrumenta divina.

Socialium legum posito in religione fundamento, pronum est iter ad stabiliendas sociorum rationes mutuas, ut convictus quietus ac res florentes consequantur. Munia sodalitatum dispartienda sunt ad communes rationes accomodate, atque ita quidem ut consensum ne minuat dissimilitudo. Officia partiri intelligenter, perspicueque definiri, plurimum ob hanc caussam interest, ne cui fiat iniuria. Commune administretur integre, ut ex indigentia singulorum præfiniatur opitulandi modus: iura officiaque dominorum cum iuribus officiisque opificum apte conveniant. Si qui ex alterutro ordine violatum se ulla re putarit, nihil optandum magis, quam adesse eiusdem corporis viros prudentes atque integros, quorum arbitrio litem dirimi leges ipsæ sociales iubeant. Illud quoque magnopere providendum ut copia operis nullo tempore deficiat opificem, utque vectigal suppeditet, unde necessitati singulorum subveniatur nec solum in subitis ac fortuitis industriæ casibus, sed etiam cum valetudo, aut senectus, aut infortunium quemquam oppressit.—His legibus, si modo voluntate accipiantur, satis erit tenuiorum commodis ac saluti consultum: consociationes autem catholicorum non minimum ad prosperitatem momenti in civitate sunt habituræ. Ex eventis præteritis non temere providemus

[1] Matth. XVI, 26.

[2] Matth. VI, 32-33.

futura. Traditur enim ætas ætate, sed rerum gestarum miræ sunt similitudines, quia reguntur providentia Dei, qui continuationem seriemque rerum ad eam caussam moderatur ac flectit, quam sibi in procreatione generis humani præstituit.—Christianis in prisca Ecclesiæ adolescentis ætate probro datum accepimus, quod maxima pars stipe precaria aut opere faciendo victitarent. Sed destituti ab opibus potentiaque, pervicere tamen ut gratiam sibi locupletium, ac patrocinium potentium adiungerent. Cernere licebat impigros, laboriosos, pacificos, iustitiæ maximeque caritatis in exemplum retinentes. Ad eiusmodi vitæ morumque spectaculum, evanuit omnis præiudicata opinio, obtrectatio obmutuit malevolorum, atque inveteratæ superstitionis commenta veritati christianæ paullatim cessere.—De statu opificum certatur in præsens: quæ certatio ratione dirimatur an secus, plurimum interest reipublicæ in utramque partem. Ratione autem facile dirimetur ab artificibus christianis, si societate coniuncti ac prudentibus auctoribus usi, viam inierint eamdem, quam patres ac maiores singulari cum salute et sua et publica tenuerunt. Etenim quantumvis magna in homine vis opinionum præiudicatarum cupiditatumque sit, tamen nisi sensum honesti prava voluntas obstupefecerit, futura est benevolentia civium in eos sponte propensior, quos industrios ac modestos cognoverint, quos æquitatem lucro, religionem officii rebus omnibus constiterit anteponere. Ex quo illud etiam consequetur commodi, quod spes et facultas sanitatis non minima suppeditabitur opificibus iis, qui vel omnino despecta fide christiana, vel alienis a professione moribus vivant. Isti quidem se plerumque intelligunt falsa spe simulataque rerum specie deceptos. Sentiunt enim, sese apud cupidos dominos valde inhumane tractari, nec fieri fere pluris quam quantum pariant operando lucri: quibus autem sodalitatibus implicati sunt, in iis pro caritate atque amore intestinas discordias existere, petulantis atque incredulæ paupertatis perpetuas comites. Fracto animo, extenuato corpore, quam valde se multi vellent e servitute tam humili vindicare: nec tamen audent, seu quod hominum pudor, seu metus inopiæ prohibeat. Iamvero his omnibus mirum quantum prodesse ad salutem collegia catholicorum possunt, si hæsitantes ad sinum suum, expediendis difficultatibus, invitarint, si resipiscentes in fidem tutelamque suam acceperint.

Habetis, Venerabiles Fratres, quos et qua ratione elaborare in caussa perdifficili necesse sit.—Accingendum ad suas cuique partes, et maturrime quidem, ne tantæ iam molis incommodum fiat insanabilius cunctatione

medicinæ. Adhibeant legum institutorumque providentiam, qui gerunt respublicas: sua meminerint officia locupletes et domini: enitantur ratione, quorum res agitur, proletarii: cumque religio, ut initio diximus, malum pellere funditus sola possit, illud reputent universi, in primis instaurari mores christianos oportere, sine quibus ea ipsa arma prudentiæ, quæ maxime putantur idonea, parum sunt ad salutem valitura.—Ad Ecclesiam quod spectat, desiderari operam suam nullo tempore nulloque modo sinet, tanto plus allatura adiumenti, quanto sibi maior in agendo libertas contigerit: idque nominatim intelligant, quorum munus est saluti publicæ consulere. Intendant omnes animi industriæque vires ministri sacrorum: vobisque, Venerabiles Fratres, auctoritate præeuntibus et exemplo, sumpta ex evangelio documenta vitæ hominibus ex omni ordine inculcare ne desinant: omni qua possunt ope pro salute populorum contendant, potissimumque studeant et tueri in se, et excitare in aliis, summis iuxta atque infimis, omnium dominam ac reginam virtutum, caritatem. Optata quippe salus expectanda præcipue est ex magna effusione caritatis: christianæ caritatis intelligimus, quæ totius Evangelii compendiaria lex est, quæque semetipsam pro aliorum commodis semper devovere parata, contra sæculi insolentiam atque immoderatum amorem sui certissima est homini antidotus: cuius virtutis partes ac lineamenta divina Paulus Apostolus iis verbis expressit: *Caritas patiens est, benigna est: non quærit quæ sua sunt: omnia suffert: omnia sustinet.*[1]

Divinorum munerum auspicem ac benevolentiæ Nostræ testem vobis singulis, Venerabiles Fratres, et Clero populoque vestro apostolicam benedictionem peramanter in Domino impertimus.

Datum Romæ apud S. Petrum die xv Maii An. MDCCCXCI, Pontificatus Nostri Decimoquarto.

LEO PP. XIII.

[1] I. Corinth. XIII, 4-7.

BOOK REVIEW.

IPSE, IPSA: IPSE, IPSA, IPSUM: WHICH? By Richard F. Quigley, LL. B., (Harvard and Boston Universities), Barrister at Law, St. John, New Brunswick, Canada.

This is a remarkable book. Remarkable as a specimen of uncompromising polemics, but more remarkable as a most lucid exposition of a well-known subject of theological controversy in which its author displays an astonishing amount of erudition in view of the fact that he is not an ecclesiastic, but a lawyer.

The book is composed, chiefly, of letters to the *St. John Globe* by Mr. Quigley and the Rev. John M. Davenport, a Ritualistic minister of that city. These letters were occasioned by "a lecture on 'Misprints,' delivered by the Right Reverend Dr. Kingdon, Coadjutor Bishop of Fredericton, New Brunswick." That is to say by the Protestant Bishop of St. John.

The pith of the lecture, and that part of it which called forth these letters consisted in this,—"Bishop Kingdon said that 'Ipsâ' in the. . . Vulgate Bible (Gen. iii. 15) was a misprint for 'Ipse,' and that the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was based or founded on it and resulted from it."

Unluckily for Bishop Kingdon and more unluckily for his Vicar, the Ritualistic minister Davenport, Mr. Quigley attended that lecture and "*on the spot, immediately after the lecture,*" he protested to the secretary of the Lecture Committee against the unfairness of the Bishop's statement.

The day following, Mr. Quigley wrote a letter to the Globe in which he pointed out that in addition to "Ipse" and "Ipsa," "Ipsum" was a various reading in the Latin MSS of the Old Testament, and that as all these readings were known to Biblical Scholars it was manifest unfairness or ignorance in the Bishop to confine the readings to "Ipse" and "Ipsa."

The Bishop did not reply to this letter from Mr. Quigley, but the Rev. Mr. Davenport did, and in his reply he asks "where then is to be found a Latin version of the Bible with *Ipsum* in this passage?" That lecture and Mr. Davenport's letter called forth, as has just been said, the admirable volume before us. Whoever reads the volume—and we are sure that few can read it without adding materially to their knowl-

edge—will, doubtless, be impressed with the severity of language which Mr. Quigley applies to his opponent, and it may be that some will regret it. But this must be said in justice to Mr. Quigley. He is answering a man who calls himself a "Catholic priest," and who uses the most outrageously insulting and disrespectful language of her who is to every true Catholic the first of all created beings.

Again, as Mr. Quigley so well says—"there is one obligation of honesty and decorum imposed on a Catholic and quite another on a Protestant."

But, after all, all that is personal in the book is only accidental, and about its substance nothing can be said that is not in praise.

As an answer to Protestant objections to "extravagant language" about our Lady, it is complete. As a vindication of the belief in the Immaculate Conception it is exhaustive.

Mr. Quigley's style is, always, clear and cogent, and often he is eloquent. Space forbids much indulgence in detail here, but there are a few lines so beautiful, and so full of meaning that we can not forego to quote them. They occur at the bottom of p. 261 and are "I am, of course, aware that there are several of the ordinary, ridiculous objections to what I have just said, but they vanish if only looked at. It may, for instance, be said that a person loves the Blessed Mary too much if he loves her more than he loves God. Not at all. He sins very grievously, but not from his excess of love for her (he cannot possibly love her enough), but from his want of love for God. Or it may be said that a person who feels sure that the Mother of God will obtain from her Son the pardon of his sins, however careless he may be of his own salvation, has too much confidence in her intercession. By no means; he is guilty of the sin of presumption, precisely in the same way as if he hoped that *God Himself* would pardon him whether he repented or not. No one would, in the latter case, say that he had too much confidence in God's power—which would mean that God's power was less than he estimated it."

Protestants often say that Ritualism is much like Catholicism. Let any one read this book, and he will not be long in discovering the utter nonsense of this assertion.

However closely a chromo may resemble a painting it never ceases to be a chromo.

It is with extreme reluctance that we abstain from indicating more in

detail the many evidences that the book presents of Mr. Quigley's knowledge of his sublime subject, and of the scholarly treatment that it receives at his hands.

To give it what it merits is to read it from beginning to end.

In conclusion, it may be of interest to American readers to know that Mr. Quigley's "true Catholic"—as he calls himself—opponent has "accepted a call" to a certain conspicuous Ritualistic Church in Philadelphia, where there is not much risk in predicting, Mr. Quigley, as the Vicar's antagonist, will be succeeded by that Reverend personage's new Bishop.

W. R. C.

ERKENNTISZLEHRE von Dr. Al. Schmid, O. O Professor an der Universität München. Erster Band pp. vii, 498. Zw. Band pp. v, 428 Freiburg im Breisgau. Herdersche Verlagshandlung (St. Louis) 1890.

No branch of human knowledge demands searching treatment more than Noetics—the Science of Knowledge itself. On the firmly established validity and accurately defined range of cognitive faculties rests the entire superstructure of science alike of the natural and supernatural orders. Its field, moreover, is the battle-ground on which Christian philosophy has had to fight in self-defence from the first onslaught of Descartes' Rationalism and Locke's Sensism, down to the latest skirmishing of Agnosticism ; and on which the countless systems of so-called Modern Philosophy have waged, one against the other, unceasing war. It is plainly therefore of vital importance that works dealing with these fundamental problems of science should be wide in their reach, profound and exhaustive in their analysis, clear and unhalting in their procedure. Of such works we have few in English, though Fr. Rickaby's First Principles, some of Dr. Mivart's works, Dr. Ward's Theistic Philosophy, Balme's Fundamental Philosophy as also Dr. McCosh's Fundamental Truth and Realistic Philosophy do excellent service. In German, French, and Italian there are kindred treatises of high merit, whilst our recent Latin Philosophical texts expound the radical principles of Noetics in their present bearings. But there are few, if any, works wherein the science of knowledge is so broadly, deeply, clearly handled as in these volumes of Dr. Schmid. We have no space here to substantiate this assertion by analysis or extract. We

must content ourselves with calling the reader's attention to the author's scope.

The world of human consciousness with the multifarious elements that enter into it from experience, reflection, and social environment lie before the searcher for the basis of knowledge. The vast material must be grouped, sifted, traced to its various sources. Answers rationally, satisfactory must be given to queries such as these: Has the mind really knowledge of objective truth—*knowledge* not apparent, probable, or doubtful but fixed, certain? If it has, what are the unfailing sources of such knowledge—sense or intellect or both? If both, what do we owe to each? What is the extent of our knowledge, where it bounds? Is it limited to the region of consciousness, or does it extend to the phenomena and essences of the outer world? Does it open out vistas in the domain of the purely intelligible? What light steady and unfailing does it throw on the spiritual?

To find exact answers to these and like questions, and to prove answers that have been given by leading philosophers ancient and modern, Dr. Schmid starts with an examination of the subject of philosophic doubt, making a strong defence of its justification and necessity, when regarded, not of course as a principle of science but, as a standpoint to be taken by the radically searching mind. Noetics must scrutinize the objective reality of the contents of human consciousness. The student must place himself in a critical attitude towards all its elements. He must begin (methodi causa) with nothing (p. 108.) Next from nothing, nothing follows; from uncertainty, certainty can never spring. Science must ultimately rest on affirmation, not on negation. Next the radical affirmation must be tested, and proved not of course *directly*, but *indirectly*, by the contradiction evidently seen in its negation, The student may at first reading be surprised at the author's extension of philosophic doubt, but re-reading will convince him that Dr. Schmid is simply applying to Noetics, the comment of St. Thomas in Aristotles' Metaphysics. (l. iii. l. i.) Dicit (philosophus) quod illi, qui volunt inquirere veritatem non considerando prius dubitationem, assimilantur illis, qui nesciunt, quo vadant. Et hoc ideo quia sicut terminus viæ est illud quod intenditur ab ambulante, ita exclusio dubitationis est finis, qui intenditur ab inquirente veritatem. Manifestum est autem, quod ille, qui nescit, quo vadat, non potest directe ire nisi forte a casu. Ergo nec aliquis potest directe inquirere veritatem, nisi prius videat dubitationem.

How the author in reality agrees with other scholastic philosophers, e. g., with Kleutgen, from whom he *appears* to differ and how he is utterly opposed to the Cartesian method the student may find for himself. (p. 109.)

The second section of the work examines very thoroughly our senses as sources of knowledge. Here the leading doctrines of philosophers from the days of Heraclitus down to our own time are stated and sifted. The third section deals with the objects, range and characteristics of the knowledge which comes to us through our intellect. The latter half of this section fills the entire second volume and is certainly the most masterly as it is the most important part of the work. Here the student will find the validity of human intelligence tested in regard to the objects of Ontology, especially as to causality in its generic grouping; to the objects of Cosmology, Psychology, Natural Theology, Logic, Ethics, and Aesthetics. The concluding hundred pages of the work are devoted to the questions of rational certitude—its kinds and criteria.

Dr. Schmid leaves us to infer that he has in view the publication of a similar treatise on Apologetics. We trust that it may soon appear; for if written with the breadth, depth, and precision which mark the present work, we will have a sample of how the Church's Theology, as well as Philosophy, need no pruning of important truths, to make them blend in harmony with all that is true in modern, critical, and natural science.

SACRED ELOQUENCE; or the Theory and Practice of Preaching. By Rev. Thomas J. Potter, Prof. of S. Eloquence in the foreign Missionary College of All Hallows. Fifth Edition.—Fr. Pustet & Co., New York and Cincinnati. 1891.

We are glad to announce this new edition of Potter's "Sacred Eloquence" undertaken through the enterprise of Messrs. Pustet & Co. The work had been practically out of print and amid an abundance of kindred literature the original publishers of this excellent book seemed disinclined to venture a new edition. The work certainly merits republication as long as books on the subject of sacred eloquence are as a rule translations or adaptations from a foreign tongue. Potter's is emphatically a text book for Seminaries, although it serves also as a work of reference to the preacher on the mission. Father Potter had lectured to the ecclesiastical students at 'All Hallows' Missionary College for ten years from notes which he carefully corrected in the course of his teach-

ing. When he finally determined to publish a systematic guide for the use of his students and others who might wish to avail themselves of his experience, he had not only grouped together the principles which appeared best to him drawn from masters old and new of sacred eloquence, but he had tested their practical value and learned to gauge their actual force under the varying circumstances of subject, time and place to which the preacher has to adapt himself.

The work is indeed well known and those who have used it in class as a text book will readily admit what the author claims for it, namely, that it embodies in a clear, simple and above all practical manner the leading principles of sacred eloquence. It pays less attention to the purely rhetorical aspect of pulpit-oratory than to the suggestion and formation of substantial ideas and leading thoughts.

We heartily recommend the book to ecclesiastical students as well as to the clergy generally.

DIE LEHRE VON DER GENUGTHUUNG CHRISTI THEOLOGISCH dargestellt und eroertert von Dr. Bernard Doerholt. Mit kirchlicher Approbation.—Paderborn: Ferdinand Shoeningh. 1891. New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co.

The question of the atonement of Christ is the cardinal point in the science of theology. On it rests the interpretation and the entire value of the Christian doctrine as to man's purpose on earth, the merit and demerit of his actions, and the measure and character of future retribution. St. Paul summed up in their briefest form the themes of ecclesiastical study, when he said: "We preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling block and to the Gentiles foolishness; but to them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ is the power and the wisdom of God," [I. Cor. I. 23.] The science of the Cross contains in truth all the precepts and maxims of moral and ascetical theology.

It is in this practical light that our author views the subject of the atonement. He believes that to understand the divine economy in regard to man is to draw close to the fountain of mercy and justice. The wonderful depth and clearness which we find in the works of the canonized theologians is much more the result of their familiarity with God, albeit full of deepest reverence, than of the tomes they studied or the schools they frequented. Hence it gives us at once a certain confidence in the orthodoxy of the author's catholic feeling, which is a very important point in works on theology, when he tells us that the com-

position of this book gave him much joy because it caused him deeply to meditate the mystery of the Redemption. The devout affection of the writer is in truth apparent throughout and throws a genial warmth and a serene light around problems difficult to solve and appealing to the highest intellectuality.

In the order of argument he begins with the proof of the fact. Next he shows its cause, that is to say the necessity of atonement, and lastly he demonstrates the completeness of the act as a full satisfaction to the divine justice. At first sight the order of development would seem to lack sufficient logical sequence but the author fully justifies his method. The process of reasoning is generally forcible and often original, as in the case of St. Anselm's opinion of which he shows both the strength and the weakness in such a way as to bring out in bold relief the real force of the argument involved. An interesting chapter is the one entitled "The Dogma of the Atonement and human reason." It may serve as a sample of the author's method generally.

Having stated the threefold bearing of the dogma and the demands which faith makes in this instance upon reason by assuming that God could suffer in the flesh that He did so of His own free will, and that the act completely atoned for the transgression of man,—he takes up the second point and strongly marks the theological difficulty that presents itself to the mind in considering it. The Divine Will could not possibly be at variance with itself. The Eternal Father commands that the sacrifice be made, and it was a necessity that Our Lord should obey the mandate since to disobey would have been sin. But an obedience leaving no choice loses its merit as a voluntary action; and if the action of Christ was not meritorious it could not serve the purpose of actually atoning. In answering the difficulty our author goes over the various solutions of the old theologians. Some hold that though it was absolutely impossible for the Son of God in His Humanity to commit sin by refusing the command of His Eternal Father, nevertheless His human will was so disposed that even had there been no command He would have undertaken the fulfillment of the sacrifice.—Others say our Lord prayed that the command might be given Him and thus the act became His free choice.—Others again hold that although our divine Lord had not actually the power under the circumstances of refusing the divine mandate of His Father, yet He had the right to ask that the divine decree might be commuted, and in foregoing this right His act became

truly meritorious. This is the opinion of Cardinal Di Lugo. Vasquez and Gregory of Valencia hold that whilst the divine command was positive, the circumstances of time and place and the degree of intensity in submitting to it were not determined and left our Lord the freedom of a choice and therefore true merit.

Dr. D. whilst not precisely discrediting these arguments points out that they rather evade the question at issue than solve it. They place the merit of the atonement not in the acceptance of the command itself but in some phase or accompanying circumstance of it, or in some disposition of His human will which He was not actually called upon to exercise. That the divine command was peremptory is plain: "Hoc mandatum accepi a Patre meo." [St. John, X, 18.] That it was in virtue of obedience to this command that the sacrifice of Our Lord became truly meritorious is equally certain. "Propterea exaltavit Eum Deus," i. e. "quia obediens erat usque ad mortem crucis." How then are we to explain the freedom of will in Christ who simply fulfilled the divine command which He could not have refused without committing sin, an idea which is absolutely inadmissible from the catholic point of view.

The author prepares the mind for the ready solution of the difficulty by recalling the scholastic definition of Freedom of the Will. The power of committing sin is not essential to the idea of liberty. If it were we should have to deny the freedom of will to the Blessed in heaven or to God Himself. On the contrary the possibility of committing wrong is a defect of liberty which attaches only *per accidens* to the present condition of man. Our Lord in assuming human nature did not take upon Himself this defect, since it is a blemish incompatible with the hypostatic union, it being metaphysically impossible that God could commit sin. The absence of this very blemish made Him capable of triumphing over the law of death, which is the effect of sin. Thus He was free, in the truest sense of the word, to offer His life for the redemption of man. "I give my life—I have power to give it and power to take it."

If it be still objected that the foregoing line of argument leaves the act of a necessary action unaltered, we should admit the caption with the distinction that a necessity of sequence ["necessitas consequentiæ"] exists indeed, but that this does not influence the free will and is distinguished in the phrase of theologians from the "necessitas consequentis." For though in the former case we know that a certain result

will follow with infallible surety, this does not imply that the will of him through whom the result is brought about is under compulsion to act.

In such simple wise as the above does the author clear up old difficulties and cast new light upon trite forms of argumentation. Nor does he confine himself to the scholastic objections, but in turn takes up the champions of modern unbelief who have attempted to throw discredit upon the reasoning of Catholic theologians. Perhaps it may be said in this connection that the author's emphatic and lengthy opposition to Hartmann's philosophical speculations is making too much of a modern rationalist whose name is quickly dying away and whose influence can only appear under new aspects equally short lived.

There is a good topical index to the work, an advantage which can not be overestimated in this age of many books when the need of some witness to the distinctive features of each is made imperative for practical use.

Messrs Pustet & Co. have published a folded tablet in black cloth-binding which contains the *Aspersio Aquæ Benedictæ*, the prayers for *Benediction of the Bl. Sacrament*, those recited immediately after mass and the prayer to St. Joseph recently indulgenced by the Holy Father. The form is very handy and supplies a general need in our churches and chapels.

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